Monthly Archive for May, 2019

BAD FAITH CLAIM CAN PROCEED AFTER COVERAGE CLAIM DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY; PRO SE PLEADING ADEQUATE TO AVOID DISMISSAL (Philadelphia Federal)

As we have discussed on this Blog for many years, case law is divided on whether statutory bad faith can exist if no coverage is due. We addressed this in some detail within this October 2018 post, summarizing a federal case where the court stated that Pennsylvania law allows for statutory bad faith even in the absence of any coverage obligation. In that October 2018 post, we additionally noted the presence of case law that would allow a bad faith claim to proceed where coverage is not due for procedural reasons, e.g., an otherwise covered claim is barred by a contractual limitations period. By contrast, this even more recent post summarizes an opinion, from the same federal court, finding there can be no bad faith if no coverage is due.

Linked here is a detailed article addressing whether Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute only addresses bad faith coverage denials and refusals to defend, and does not provide relief for poor claims handling or the like when these underlying benefits are not due. Under this view, poor claims handling or communications failures are evidence of statutory bad faith in denying benefits, but such conduct is not actionable (cognizable) statutory bad faith in itself.

BAD FAITH CLAIM CAN PROCEED EVEN IF COVERAGE NOT DUE UNDER CONTRACTUAL LIMITATIONS PROVISION

In the present case, arising out of the very same federal court as the aforementioned cases, the insured’s breach of contract claim was dismissed as time-barred by the policy’s suit limitation clause. The court, however, permitted the bad faith action to proceed. Specifically, the court stated: “Because Plaintiff asserts bad faith as to conduct beyond [the carrier’s] denial of coverage, the Court must consider the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s bad faith claim even though Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is time-barred.”

The court quoted from footnote 3 of the 2017 Dagit case: “It is well established that a claim for bad faith brought against an insurer pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371 is a separate and distinct cause of action and is not contingent on the resolution of the underlying contract claim. Thus, if bad faith is asserted as to conduct beyond a denial of coverage, the bad faith claim is actionable as to that conduct regardless of whether the contract claim survives.”

[Note: Dagit relies on cases such as Doylestown Electric Supply Co. v. Maryland Casualty Insurance Co., 942 F. Supp. 1018 (E.D. Pa. 1996), March v. Paradise Mutual Insurance Co., 646 A.2d 1254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), and the Third Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Gallatin Fuels, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 244 F. App’x 424 (3d Cir. 2007). As in the present case, Doylestown Electrical and March involved contractual suit limitations provisions barring coverage, and not lack of coverage under substantive policy provisions. Gallatin Fuels addressed the extraordinary situation where the policy was not in effect at the relevant time, but the court held the bad faith statute still applied because the insurer believed it had a policy in effect and acted poorly while holding that belief. These cases are addressed in the article linked here and above.]

INSURED ADEQUATELY PLEADS BAD FAITH

After finding the bad faith claim could proceed, the court still had to address the complaint’s adequacy. It found the bad faith claim adequately pleaded, stating:

[The insurer] argues that [the insured] does not provide any facts to support his allegation that [the insurer] acted in bad faith by denying him coverage under the insurance policy for the damage sustained to his home by the snowstorm. … To the contrary, [the insured] sets forth a myriad of facts to support his claim. For example, [the insured] alleges he was given contradictory information by [the insurer’s] agents as to the coverage of his policy and how he could collect under his policy and subsequently appeal [the insurer’s] denial of that coverage, which he relied upon to his detriment. … [The insured] also alleges that he was instructed to file multiple claims, which caused him to pay multiple deductibles and which ultimately discredited his claim. … In holding [the insured’s] Second Amended Complaint to a “less stringent standard,” as required of the Court in light of [his] pro se representation, the Court finds that [the insured] sufficiently alleged a claim for bad faith and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied as to this claim.

Date of Decision: May 10, 2019

Nguyen v. Allstate Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-5019, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79822 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2019) (Kenney, J.)

(1) NO BAD FAITH POSSIBLE WHERE NO COVERAGE DUE; (2) INSURER’S REASONABLE RELIANCE ON ENGINEERING EXPERT’S REPORT FOR A COVERAGE DECISION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE BAD FAITH (Western District)

There were two bad faith claims arising out of a building’s wall collapse case. The first was over whether any coverage was due in connection with building walls that had not collapsed, for which the insured sought replacement to match restoration of the collapsed wall. The second had to do with whether the carrier owed additional damage payments for claims more directly related to the collapse.

The court determined no coverage was due for the other walls, and granted summary judgment on that coverage issue. Because no coverage was due, the court necessarily found “no basis for a bad faith claim based upon an unreasonable denial of coverage.”

Second, the court observed the parties’ experts disagreed on the scope of damages and amount due concerning the wall collapse. The court granted summary judgment on bad faith on this claim as well, finding insurer reasonably relied on its experts in determining the amount of damages it would pay.

The court stated:

As regards additional payment of damages, [the insured] argues that disagreements between the parties’ experts precludes the entry of summary judgment on the bad faith claim. Courts have held that “an insurer’s reasonable reliance on an engineering expert’s report for a coverage decision does not constitute bad faith.” Hamm v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 908 F.Supp.2d 656, 673 (W.D.Pa.2012) (citing El Bor Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 787 F.Supp.2d 341, 349 (E.D.Pa.2011) (insurance company’s reliance on engineer’s findings as a basis for denial of coverage provides reasonable grounds to deny benefits)) “Moreover, even if the expert incorrectly assessed the cause of damage, this is not evidence that his conclusions were unreasonable or that Defendant acted unreasonably in relying upon them.” Totty v. Chubb Corp., 455 F.Supp.2d 376, 390 (W.D.Pa.2006) (citing Pirino v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 3:04CV698, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27519, 2005 WL 2709014, at *5 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 21, 2005)).

Here, [the insured] only identifies conflicts amongst the expert’s opinions on causation and damages and not the reasonableness of [the carrier’s] expert opinions. The conflict between experts may preclude summary judgment on other claims, but not for bad faith. Based upon the reasonableness standard in the bad faith statute coupled with the high burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence, the Court concludes that a reasonable juror could not find bad faith in [the insured’s] favor. …

Date of Decision: May 14, 2019

Keyser v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., U. S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania 2:18-CV-00226-MJH, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81194 (W.D. Pa. May 14, 2019) (Horan, J.)

AN INSURED MUST PLEAD SOME SPECIFIC DETAILS RAISING CONDUCT TO THE LEVEL OF BAD FAITH TO SURVIVE A MOTION TO DISMISS, AND NOT SIMPLY THAT A CLAIM WAS DENIED OR A DEMAND REJECTED (Philadelphia Federal)

This was the insureds’ second chance at pleading bad faith, after having their original UIM bad faith counterclaim dismissed without prejudice. The earlier post summarizing the first dismissal can be found here.

The second try fared no better. Rather, review of the second amended counterclaim made “clear that any further attempt at amendment would be futile because Defendants cannot plead their bad faith claim with adequate factual support and specificity.”

Once again, the court observed that: “A bad faith claim is ‘fact specific’ and depends upon the insure[r]’s conduct in connection with handling and evaluating a specific claim.” … As the party bringing the bad faith claim under 42 PA. C.S. § 8371, it is [the insured’s] burden to “‘describe who, what, where, when, and how the alleged bad faith conduct occurred.’”

The insureds’ two new paragraphs, set forth below, were deemed conclusory:

  1. Specifically, Insurance Company has taken [the insured’s] testimony and has been provided all of her documentation, which clearly demonstrates that she was covered under the applicable insurance policy and that her damages are far in excess of the UIM coverage amount.

  2. However, despite objective and subjective knowledge that [the insured] was covered under the applicable insurance policy and that her damages are far in excess of the UIM coverage amount, Insurance Company refused to honor their obligations under the insurance agreement for the bad faith purpose of seeking to evade their obligations to the Das family under the insurance contract.

The court observed that these paragraphs lacked “’the dates of any actions’ taken regarding the policy to support their allegation of unreasonable delay, nor have [the insureds] explained, in detail, ‘what was unfair’ about Plaintiff’s interpretation of the policy provisions.”

The court added:

Absent specific details that establish a dishonest purpose, it is not bad faith for an insurer to investigate and protect its interests during litigation. Jung v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 949 F. Supp. 353, 360 (E.D. Pa.1997) (finding that insurer “had a reasonable basis to investigate and deny the claim.”). Moreover, the failure of an insurance company “to immediately accede to a demand for the policy limit” is not, without specific facts, enough to establish bad faith. Smith, 506 F. App’x at 137. [The insureds’] inclusion of two conclusory paragraphs to the Second Amended Counterclaim does not alter that conclusion.

The inability to plead bad faith also required dismissing the punitive damages claim with prejudice as well.

Date of Decision: May 8, 2019

Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Das, U. S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-1613, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78320 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2019) (Jones, II, J.)

COURT STRIKES ALLEGATIONS THAT INFER DUTIES OUTSIDE THE POLICY, BUT PERMITS ALLEGATIONS OF PRESENT OR PAST BENEFIT DENIALS (Middle District)

Offering a different take on the usual challenge to federal pleadings, the insurer moved to strike portions of this UIM bad faith complaint as immaterial and impertinent, rather than to dismiss the entire complaint.

The complaint pleaded the insurer’s alleged refusal to pay full medical benefits, and the alleged consequences of that refusal vis-à-vis the insured and third parties. The insurer focused its motion on striking four specific paragraphs of the complaint.

The first two paragraphs raised the insurer’s advertisements directed to members of the military. The insured, a long serving Army veteran, alleged that he relied on representations and warranties made in these advertisements, which the insurer breached. The court agreed to strike these two paragraphs as irrelevant to the issue of whether the insurer breached a duty under the policy itself, or violated the bad faith statute. In addition, the court found these warranty averments prejudicial, as they could lead a jury to believe the insurer owed duties outside the policy.

The court, however, refused to strike the other two paragraphs at issue.

One of these paragraphs included an averment that the insurer refused to pay a benefit due, while also mentioning grievances directed at third parties. The alleged refusal to pay the insured was enough to preserve this paragraph, even though the allegations regarding third parties may not be actionable.

As to the final paragraph at issue, the insurer took the position that the injuries at issue did not arise from the accident. The insured argued the ramifications of this erroneous position posed a variety of detriments to him, with simultaneous advantages to the insurer. While the paragraph did have some focus on contingent future conduct, it still alleged the insurer had already refused to pay for medical treatment, and how this refusal might be used by the insurer to its advantage in limiting payments or evidence. The court held: “These averments could bear some possible relation to whether Defendant … breached a duty owed under the Policy or imposed by Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute. See Rancosky v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 642 Pa. 153, 170 A.3d 364, 365 (Pa. 2017) (finding that evidence of an insurance company’s motive of self-interest or ill-will may be probative of a bad faith claim).”

Date of Decision: May 6, 2018

Bacon v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania No. 1:18-cv-01686, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76218, 2019 WL 1988214 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2019) (Kane, J.)

PERSONS NOT INSURED UNDER A POLICY CANNOT BRING A BAD FAITH CLAIM (Middle District)

This case involved a forced placed insurance policy. The mortgagee lender, not the homeowner, was the name insured on the policy at issue. The homeowner was not a named insured.

After suffering a loss, the homeowner brought breach of contract and bad faith claims against the insurer. The court held that both claims failed since the homeowner was not a covered insured under the policy. The court further rejected third party beneficiary and equitable estoppel arguments.

Date of Decision: May 3, 2019

Richard v. Finance of America Mortgages, LLC, U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania 3:18-CV-559, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75156, 2019 WL 1980693 (M.D. Pa. May 3, 2019) (Mariani, J.)

“SWEEPING” CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS CANNOT SUPPORT A BAD FAITH CLAIM (Middle District)

This case involved the issue of whether the insureds resided at a property when a fire loss occurred. The insurer denied coverage, concluding they did not, and that certain misrepresentations were made by the insureds in connection with the fire loss claim. The insureds sued for breach of contract and bad faith.

In their complaint, the insureds asserted “that the property was in fact occupied at the time of the fire as the Plaintiffs were making ongoing and continuous repairs and renovations to the dwelling.” Judge Caputo agreed with the insurer that because “Plaintiffs allege not that they resided at the property, but only that they ‘occupied’ the property at the time of the loss as a result of ‘ongoing and continuous repairs and renovations to the dwelling’ … that Plaintiffs have failed to state a breach of contract claim.”

As to the bad faith claim, Plaintiffs allegations were conclusory and they offered no “factual averments supporting these sweeping allegations of bad faith.” The conclusory, sweeping, allegations included:

“(1) Defendant has ‘undertaken this course of action and unilaterally, without justification, deprived Plaintiffs of their rightful payment for damages to their property [] . . . all in the financial interest of [the insurer] and in disregard of the interest of their insureds . . .’”

“(2) Defendant’s ‘actions constitute a pattern in practice, not only in this claim, but in the handling of other claims in which totally unfair and unethical negotiation and settlement tactics are not only employed but encouraged by Defendant . . .’” and

“(3) Defendant ‘has acted with obvious bad faith and/or reckless disregard to the rights of their insured in failing to pay the Plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to the terms and conditions of the above mentioned homeowners insurance policy.’”

Judge Caputo did give the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint as to both the breach of contract and bad faith claims.

Date of Decision: May 2, 2019

Bloxham v. Allstate Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania NO. 3:19-CV-0481, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74139 (M.D. Pa. May 2, 2019) (Caputo, J.)

COVERAGE WAS “FAIRLY DEBATABLE” SO BAD FAITH CLAIM COULD NOT PROCEED (New Jersey Federal)

In this case, the court provides a concise and clear analysis of New Jersey’s “fairly debatable” standard in bad faith cases. If an insured cannot win summary judgment on coverage, then the claim is fairly debatable and there can be no bad faith as a matter of law.

In this disability case, medical and vocational experts disputed each other on critical points. This created issues of material fact as to whether the insured could perform in any gainful occupation; a dispute that could only be decided by a jury.   Thus, the court denied the insured summary judgment on coverage.

This necessarily made the claim “fairly debatable” for bad faith purposes, and the court granted summary judgment to the insurer on the bad faith claim.

Date of Decision: April 29, 2019

Bell v. Crown Life Insurance Co., U. S. District Court District of New Jersey Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-8006-BRM-DEA, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79013 (D.N.J. April 29, 2019) (Martinotti, J.)

PLEADING MORE DETAILS FROM COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE INSURER IN AMENDED COMPLAINT STILL FAILS TO SET OUT PLAUSIBLE BAD FAITH CLAIM (Middle District)

This opinion addresses the insurer’s motion to dismiss an amended complaint for failing to set out a plausible bad faith claim. The court dismissed the original complaint for failing to do so, but without prejudice to file an amended complaint. Applying the same reasoning in the first case, Judge Caputo dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. A summary of the first opinion can be found here.

The insured charity operated a restaurant. It reported a theft, seeking coverage under a commercial liability policy. The coverage issue involved whether the thief was an officer or employee. The insured’s public adjuster and the insurer’s claim handler communicated on this issue over a three-month period, including specific communications about the treasurer’s bonding status. The insurer took the position the claim was not covered.

Judge Caputo had dismissed the previous complaint for pleading only conclusory allegations, and for only including factual allegations insufficient to support a plausible bad faith claim.

The amended complaint includes the same 12 conclusory allegations found in the original complaint. The only difference between the original and amended complaints “is that the later filed pleading details the substance of conversations between Plaintiff’s public adjuster and Defendants’ adjuster during a three week period in April 2017.” However, those additional allegations remained insufficient to set out a plausible bad faith claim. The court stated:

“What those allegations reveal, inter alia, is that Defendants considered the information provided by Plaintiff, requested additional information be provided to determine if there existed a basis to extend coverage, and explained their reasoning for initially determining why no coverage existed for the loss. … Ultimately, Defendants concluded that the loss was not covered. … While Defendants may ultimately be incorrect and the denial of coverage may constitute a breach of the parties’ insurance agreement, this alone does not state a plausible bad faith cause of action. Indeed, none of the allegations in the Amended Complaint support a plausible basis to find that Defendants engaged in bad faith with respect to Plaintiff’s theft claim.”

Judge Caputo dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, since the insured already had an opportunity to cure the pleading defects.

Date of Decision: April 26, 2019

Wyoming Valley FOP v. Selective Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania NO. 3:18-CV-2270, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71036 (M.D. Pa. April 26, 2019) (Caputo, J.)

COURT (1) DISMISSES BAD FAITH CLAIM THAT DOES NOT ALLEGE FACTS SHOWING “HOW” THE PUTATIVE BAD FAITH OCCURRED, AND (2) OBSERVES THE INSURED FILED SUIT, WITHOUT NEGOTIATING OR COMMUNICATING WITH THE INSURER, AFTER THE INSURER MADE AN INITIAL OFFER ONLY ONE MONTH PRIOR TO SUIT (Philadelphia Federal)

We first note that Eastern District Judge Kearney typically writes informative introductions as guides to his opinions, with summaries of the salient conclusions. We quote his introduction to this UIM bad faith case at length (in addition to summarizing the opinion):

“A car insurer’s verbal offer to pay approximately half of its insured’s alleged medical bills as underinsured motorist benefits may allow the insured to sue for breach of the insurance contract. But the verbal offer does not automatically equal bad faith under Pennsylvania’s insurance statutes. The insured must plead much more than her insurer did not offer her all she requested. The insured deciding to sue the insurer for statutory bad faith a month after the verbal offer instead of responding to the offer, opening discussions, or negotiating the import of submitted medical data may sue to obtain negotiating leverage. The tactic must include a complaint with specific facts or we will summarily dismiss this bad faith claim supported by conclusions rather than facts. Absent pleading more than a breach of contract, we today grant the insurer’s partial motion to dismiss the insured’s bad faith and punitive damages claims.”

The insured settled with the other driver, and submitted her medical bills to the insurer, seeking UIM coverage. The medical bills were approximately $14,000 and the insurer offered $7,000 in UIM benefits on February 7, 2019. Less than one month later, the insured sued for breach of contract and statutory bad faith.

Judge Kearney applied the Third Circuit’s decision in Smith v. State Farm in coming to his decision. Smith emphasizes that bad faith cases are fact specific, and must look at the insurer’s conduct vis-à-vis the insured for the matter at issue. Conclusory statements unsupported by factual allegations cannot survive a motion to dismiss.

First, Judge Kearney found the following allegations conclusory:

“[i]) failed to investigate and evaluate her claim in an objective and fair manner,

[ii] used invasive and improper investigative tactics,

[iii] engaged in dilatory claim’s handling,

[iv] failed to promptly offer payment,

[v] failed to provide contracted-for insurance coverage

[vi] subordinated her interest to its financial interest,

[vii] violated its fiduciary duty owed to her,

[viii] compelled her to sue,

[ix] caused her to spend money on litigation and endure anxiety associated with litigation.”

Beyond these patently conclusory allegations, the court further found that the following allegations, while somewhat more specific, still lacked any factual support, and were thus likewise conclusory:

  1. The insurer “acted in bad faith when it played a ‘cat and mouse’ game with her, [and] offered $7,000 on February 7, 2019 though it knew the amount did not ‘cover lawfully recoverable medical bills….” On this point, the court states asserted that the insurer “played a ‘cat and mouse’ game, caused her to spend money on litigation, or caused her anxiety associated with litigation does not plead … bad faith.”

  2. The insurer “failed to provide her with a calculation or summary of how it determined its offer.”

  3. The insurer “’ignored or acted with reckless indifference’ to the medical documents establishing her injuries and entitlement to underinsured motorist benefits.” However, Judge Kearney found the insured “alleges no facts showing how [the insurer] ignored or acted with reckless indifference to reviewing her medical records. To the contrary, [the] $7,000 verbal offer in February 2019 suggests it did review her medical records.”

  4. The insurer “did not have a doctor examine her immediately, [and therefore] it lacked refuting ‘medical evidence or documentation’ and refused to pay benefits without justification.”

The court found the complaint flawed for failing to allege how the insurer “failed to investigate and evaluate her claim in an objective and fair manner, subordinated her interest to its own, or violated its fiduciary duty owed to her.” Further, the insured did “not plead her communications with [the insurer] or [the insurer’s] conduct even though a claim for bad faith is based on [the insurer’s] conduct in handling her claim.” This included that she did “not plead calls or communications since the February 7, 2019 verbal offer of $7,000.”

The court also was concerned with contradictions in the pleadings. It noted the complaint alleged both that the insurer failed to promptly make a settlement offer and that the insurer offered the $7,000 one month after she submitted her medical records to the insurer. The court found these allegations contradictory.

The bad faith count was dismissed without prejudice for failing to allege facts supporting a plausible claim.

Finally, the court dismissed the punitive damages claim, again without prejudice, because the bad faith claim was dismissed. Judge Kearney found that a simple breach of contract, the only claim remaining, cannot be the basis for punitive damages.

Date of Decision: April 22, 2019

Hwang v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-927, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67955, 2019 WL 1765938 (E.D. Pa. April 22, 2019) (Kearney, J.)

COURT PERMITS BAD FAITH CLAIM TO PROCEED EVEN THOUGH NO COVERAGE IS DUE BECAUSE OF CONTRACTUAL LIMITATIONS PERIOD (Middle District)

While the Court granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claimed based on a contractual limitations period, and reiterated its earlier position that the bad faith statute does not allow for actual or consequential damages, the court did allow the statutory bad faith claim to proceed.

The court looked to the Third Circuit’s 2015 Wolfe opinion, finding a statutory bad faith claim viable even if the underlying claim was fully paid, where a delay in making that payment arose from bad faith claims handling. If bad faith delays were not actionable, an insurer could consistently act in bad faith with no consequences, i.e., take an unreasonable position on coverage, knowingly or recklessly disregard its unreasonableness in delaying payment, and then finally relent in paying to obviate itself from the consequences of the bad faith delays in paying a valid claim.

Further, Wolfe observes that courts will deem nominal damages to exist if there is a breach of contract, which can then form the basis for statutory remedies under section 8371.

Under both of these theories, an injured plaintiff can still pursue statutory interest, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees under the bad faith statute, even if no compensatory damages are due.

[Note 1: In this case, unlike the Wolfe scenario, there was no breach of contract and no coverage due. Thus, there is a genuine issue as to whether the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Wolfe applies, as it is premised on the principles that (1) coverage was due and there was a bad faith delay in payment, and that (2) there was a breach of contract for which nominal damages are due. Neither circumstance exists in this case. That being said, there has been at least some older case law allowing a bad faith claim to proceed where the contract claim is denied on procedural grounds like the statute of limitations, rather than on the substantive policy language, an argument that is not put forward in this opinion.]

[Note 2: Although the court observed that compensatory and consequential damages are not available under the bad faith statute, this opinion implicitly recognizes such damages can be available under other, common law, theories. These are not detailed, but the Supreme Court’s Birth Center case is cited in Pratts, which allows compensatory or consequential damages under breach of contract bad faith theories in certain circumstances.]

Date of Decision: May 2, 2019

Pratts v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania NO. 3:16-CV-2385, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74141 (M.D. Pa. May 2, 2019) (Caputo, J.)

The court’s earlier ruling in Pratts can be found here.