Archive for the 'NJ – Settlement related issues' Category


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The plaintiff-excess insurer sued a primary auto insurance carrier for failing to settle within its $1,000,000 policy limits. The case went to trial against the insured driver, and the jury verdict exceeded the $1,000,000 primary policy limit. Thus, the excess insurer wound up paying over $600,000, and it brought suit to recover those funds from the primary carrier.

The detailed history between the injured claimant and the primary insurer shows ongoing negotiations, a mediation, case assessments, and a suggested settlement by the trial judge. Almost none of these valuations or negotiations placed the case value in excess of $1,000,000.  In fact, the injured claimant and their counsel valued the case for settlement in the $600,000 to $750,000 range, though the claimant would not accept less than $750,000. (Claimant’s counsel would have agreed to a settlement in the $600,000 range.)  The primary carrier would not settle at $750,000, but did offer $600,000 at one time.

The case went to trial, resulting in a $1,400,000 verdict.

The umbrella carrier’s complaint alleged liability for the primary insurer’s breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith and settle, along with asserting it was equitably subrogated to the insured concerning the excess payments above the $1,000,000 limit.

Both sides moved for summary judgment, and both motions were denied. New Jersey District Judge Cecchi found material issues of fact remained to be decided.

Rova Farms analysis

Judge Cecchi set out the following standard:

Under the seminal case of Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974), a primary insurer is liable to an excess insurer for an excess verdict where the primary insurer failed to settle with a third-party claimant within the primary policy limit prior to trial, and where, prior to trial, (1) a jury could have potentially found liability for the third-party claimant and the potential verdict could have exceeded the primary policy limit, (2) the third-party claimant was willing to settle within the primary policy limit, and (3) the primary insurer did not negotiate in “good faith.”

The only disputed issue was whether the primary insurer did not negotiate in good faith.  The relevant legal principles applicable include:

  1. The primary insurer “has a positive fiduciary duty” to act in “good faith,” i.e., “to take the initiative and attempt to negotiate a settlement within the [primary] policy coverage.”

  2. Thus, a primary insurer’s “negotiation strategy” with the third-party claimant must have a “reasonable prospect for a successful outcome” for both itself and the excess insurer … such that the strategy is not infected with “dishonest[y]” or “negligence.”

  3. Moreover, consideration of “all the factors bearing upon the advisability of a settlement,” including the primary insurer’s “experience, expertise and judgment,” is required to assess this “good faith” inquiry.

  4. Finally, evaluating whether a primary insurer negotiated in “good faith” must not be done in “[h]indsight,” e.g., a “mere failure to settle within the [primary] policy limit when there was an opportunity to do so before or during trial is not a per se demonstration of bad faith.”

Disputes of material facts remain open

Disputes of fact remained open concerning the settlement value the primary carrier placed on the case at the mediation, and whether that value, once determined, was reasonably calculated.  Judge Cecchi was particularly interested in the factual question of whether the settlement authority given at the mediation differed significantly from the primary insurer’s internal valuation numbers.

Judge Cecchi further noted that while the excess carrier adduced facts that the primary insurer placed a much higher value on the case than it offered in settlement, the primary carrier argued that the “full value” it may have placed on the case, or how it determines reserves, were materially different kinds of evaluations from determining a settlement value.

There were also disputes of facts over the primary carrier’s alleged “hard ball” negotiation tactics at the mediation.  Again, the excess carrier drew on facts that made the primary carrier seem unreasonable, but the primary carrier argued it was willing to be more flexible than the picture plaintiff painted.  This factual dispute could not be resolved at the summary judgment stage.

Hindsight cannot be used to argue the presence or absence of bad faith

Judge Cecchi lastly observed that courts, and presumably the ultimate triers of fact, could not use hindsight to advance or defend their positions. She states:

For instance, Plaintiff argues that the trial verdict of over $1,000,000 awarded to Claimant demonstrates that Defendant’s limited extension of settlement authority and subsequent settlement offer at the Mediation were unreasonably low and thus made in “bad faith.” … Alternatively, Defendant argues that, irrespective of whether its settlement offer to Claimant was too low, it did not negotiate in “bad faith” at the Mediation because it was not reasonable at that time to settle with Claimant for $750,000, a figure which Defendant later learned Claimant would not have “move[d] below” …. Nevertheless, “the perfect vision of hindsight is not the lens through which our courts assess compliance with good-faith obligations.” …. Rather, whether Defendant negotiated in “good faith” at the Mediation depends only on the facts known to it at that time.  (Emphasis added)

Date of Decision: March 30, 2021

Hartford Casualty Insurance v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, U.S. District Court District of New Jersey No. 18-CV-0444, 2021 WL 1186759 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2021) (Cecchi, J.)


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This case involved one named insured and two additional insureds under a single policy. All three were sued for negligence in a serious personal injury action, and the carrier provided a defense to all three in that action.

The policy limit was $1,000,000.  The underlying plaintiff sought $7,000,000 in the litigation, but agreed to settle for $650,000 for all three insureds. The carrier offered $250,000 to settle for all three of its insureds. Plaintiff did not respond to that offer.

The two additional insureds settled on their own, without the carrier, for $350,000.  The case proceeded against the named insured, which was still being defended by the carrier’s appointed defense counsel.  The named insured’s defense successfully focused on blaming the two “empty chair” defendants.

The settling additional insureds brought this action for bad faith breach of contract to recover the $350,000 settlement payment from the carrier. The carrier moved to dismiss the claim, and the court denied that motion.

General Bad Faith Standards

The court observed generally:

  1. Under New Jersey law, an insurer “has a positive fiduciary duty to take the initiative and attempt to negotiate a settlement within the policy coverage.”

  2. An insured has a cause of action against an insurer “whose bad faith in refusing to settle a personal injury action within its policy limits exposed its insured to a jury verdict substantially in excess of the policy limits.”

  3. “Good faith” requires an insurer consider both the insured’s and its own interests “in deciding whether or not to settle the case within the limits of the policy. The [insurer] must weigh the conflicting interests by making its decision to settle or go to trial as if it had full coverage for whatever verdict may be recovered, regardless of policy limits.”

  4. Where the insurer acts in bad faith in not settling, “an insured [is] permitted to [s]ettle the tort claims … and then recover from the insured the amount paid in settlement … up to the policy limits, provided that such sums were reasonable and were paid in good faith.”

Insureds Taking Settlement into Their Own Hands, and Bad Faith

Applying these principles, the court denied the insurer’s motion to dismiss.

The court first rejected the argument that the insured had breached the duty to cooperate by settling without the insurer’s permission. It observed, “where the insurer first violates its own contractual obligation to consider, in good faith, the insured’s interests in settlement, the insurer forfeits the right to control the settlement.” Under those circumstances, an insured “may ‘proceed to make a prudent good faith settlement,’ then ‘upon proof of the breach of the insurer’s obligation and the reasonableness and good faith of the settlement made … [the insured may] recover the amount [paid],’ up to the policy limit.”

Thus, the issue became whether the insured adequately pleaded the insurer’s bad faith failure to settle within policy limits.

Case does not have to be Tried to Verdict to Raise a Bad Faith Claim

The court rejected the argument that a case had to be tried to verdict before a bad faith claim could be pursued. Rather, the insured only has to plead it was exposed to a potential excess verdict. In this case, the insured adequately pleaded the potential liability exceeded the $1,000,000 policy limits.

The Factual Allegations are Adequate to State a Bad Faith Claim

The court also found plaintiff alleged sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” The complaint alleged a potential multi-million dollar exposure; that the $250,000 offer did “not reflect a good faith effort to consider the insureds’ interests, and instead was a self-interested calculation that trial was worth the risk, given its own exposure was limited to $1 million”; the insurer’s “refusal to appropriately consider settlement forced [the insureds] to independently settle, leaving [the named insured], represented by [the carrier]-paid and directed attorneys, the sole defendant at trial.”

As to this last averment, that the carrier controlled the defense of one insured while the additional insureds were effectively defenseless before the jury, “[t]his allegedly allowed [the insurer] to use the ultimately successful strategy at trial of placing total fault on the ‘empty chairs’….” The additional insureds alleged bad faith maneuvering in how defense counsel purportedly manipulated the jury verdict form to omit the additional insureds from allocation of fault. The additional insureds alleged that this conflicted with the carrier’s trial strategy of blaming the empty chairs, and reflected a post hoc effort to justify the insurer’s failure to engage in settlement.

The carrier’s response went primarily to the facts, which functionally undermined its argument at the motion to dismiss stage. For example, the insurer argued its $250,000 offer was meaningful, and that there were significant liability questions on which the case could be defended. At the pleading stage, however, the court had to take the insured’s facts as true, and draw all reasonable inferences from the insured’s facts as pleaded, while discounting the insurer’s facts that included matters outside the complaint.

Date of Decision: October 15, 2020

Brightview Enterprise Solutions, LLC v. Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co., U.S. District Court District of New Jersey No. 20-CV-7915 SDW/LDW, 2020 WL 6074474 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2020)


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The insureds were attorneys sued by an insurance carrier. The insured attorneys sought coverage from their own professional liability carrier, and the malpractice carrier asserted no coverage was due. The attorneys/insureds and the professional liability carrier each sought a declaration in their favor on coverage.

The insureds won an early summary judgment ruling form a magistrate judge that the professional liability carrier had a duty to defend. The magistrate judge denied the professional liability carrier reconsideration and permission to take an interlocutory appeal.  She did not rule on any indemnification responsibility, as the underlying suit against the attorneys remained pending.

The professional liability insurer still wanted to take an examination under oath, and the insured responded by seeking a protective order.  Initially, the magistrate judge administratively terminated the case, pending the outcome of the underlying action.

Issues arose concerning the insured’s cooperation in connection with defending the underlying suit.  The magistrate judge reopened the case, ruling that an examination under oath should go forward, that the insureds had a duty to cooperate under the professional liability policy, and that the insureds were not entitled to defense costs during periods of non-cooperation.

The present decision involves an appeal to the District Court from the magistrate judge’s order.

The magistrate judge found the insureds had failed to cooperate by delaying the examination under oath, failed to respond to the professional liability carrier’s offer of defense, and failed to respond to a request for information. She held that although the insureds did not act in bad faith, their actions did appreciably prejudice the malpractice carrier.

On appeal, the District Court agreed that there had been a failure to cooperate, but this failure was not the result of bad faith. The District Court reversed, however, on the issue of appreciable prejudice, finding none. Most important, the insurer had not “irretrievably lost the opportunity to take [an examination under oath]….” Nor was the carrier “precluded from discovering facts that may weigh against coverage under the Policy.”

The District Court agreed with the magistrate judge that there was no appreciable prejudice due to the insured’s refusal to respond concerning the carrier’s providing a defense, stating: “Irrespective of whether Plaintiffs accepted or rejected the defense offer before the [underlying] suit settlement, the only issue remaining post settlement pertains to indemnification. … Thus, there can be no appreciable prejudice … for its inability to defend the [underlying] suit before it settled. Any dispute regarding Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to provide information, including defense costs, may be addressed when the indemnification issue is decided. Accordingly, because [the professional liability carrier] failed to demonstrate appreciable prejudice, it cannot disclaim coverage for Plaintiffs’ noncooperation under the Policy.”

The District Court affirmed the magistrate’s ruling that there was no defect in the malpractice carrier’s reservation of rights.

Likewise, the District Court upheld the magistrate’s decision that the carrier was entitled to the examination under oath, and finding a failure to cooperate. First, the right to take the examination had not been waived. Nor was the request for the examination unreasonable or unfair: “For the reasons already stated, [the] ROR was proper after this Court determined that [the underlying] suit triggered a duty to defend and reserved on the issue of indemnification. It would defy logic to find that [the professional liability carrier] has a duty to defend and properly reserved its rights as to liability yet preclude an EUO to investigate the underlying claims pursuant to the Policy.”

Finally, simply settling the case did not end the insured’s obligations to cooperate under the policy, which expressly provided the insurer with the right to take an examination under oath.

Date of Decision:  September 23, 2020

Karzadi, v. Evanston Insurance Company, U.S. District Court District of New Jersey No. 17-5470 SDWCLW, 2020 WL 5652442 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2020) (Wigenton, J.)


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In this case, New Jersey’s Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal and grant of summary judgment to the insurer on all claims, but reversed the trial court’s award of frivolous litigation sanctions against the insured because there was no finding the insured acted in bad faith in bringing the claims.

Factual Background

The insurer provided the eighth layer of excess insurance in this Superstorm Sandy case. The primary and lower layers provided $75 Million, and the eighth layer provided another $50 Million above that.

In 2012, the insured hired a contractor to do repair and restoration work. The contractor allocated $950,000 to specific building repair and restoration work. The excess carriers all determined repair and restoration work was not covered. In 2014, the insured reached a global settlement with all insurers for $93.5 Million. The eighth layer insurance contributed $16 Million. The insured executed a release for any and all claims and demands for Superstorm Sandy property damage and business income losses, discharging the eighth layer insurer.

In 2015, however, the insured asked the eighth layer insurer to reconsider paying the contractor’s repair and restoration costs, after another anticipated source for this loss did not pan out. The eighth layer carrier refused. The insured brought suit in 2015.

The Litigation

The insured alleged it relied on the advice of the excess insurers’ adjuster and experts in how the repair and restoration costs were allocated, which resulted in it obtaining no sum to settle that out-of-pocket payment. The insured alleges that it only agreed to the 2014 settlement based on this bad advice, and would otherwise have included these repair and replacement costs in its negotiations and settlement with the insured, beyond the sum actually paid.

The insured brought various claims against the adjusters and experts, and claimed the eighth layer insurance was liable for their acts and omissions on an agency theory. The insured also claimed the eighth layer insurer was liable for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and bad faith in denying the claim for the repair and restoration costs. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims, which the trial court granted in part, including the unjust enrichment claim and some of the agency theory claims. The remaining claims were later dismissed on summary judgment.

The eighth layer insurer filed a motion against the insured for frivolous litigation sanctions. The trial court granted that motion, and ruled the insurer was entitled to the attorney’s fees and costs.

The insured appealed the grant of summary judgment and the sanctions.

The Appellate Division Affirms for the Insurer on the Merits

First, the Appellate Division found no support in the record that the release was only executed as the result of fraud. The insured was well aware it was settling all Superstorm Sandy related claims, that the repair and restoration costs were not part of the settlement, and that the release would bar Superstorm Sandy related claims against all insurers. The insured was also aware that the repair and restoration costs were subject to recovery regarding another entity and its insurers, and that the settling excess insurance companies would not agree to make their settlement contingent on the outcome of that separate matter.

Next, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s findings that there was no common law fraud or negligent misrepresentation by the agent or the insurer. It likewise affirmed judgment on the negligence claim on the basis that no expert testimony was proffered regarding the conduct of the independent insurance adjuster (which plaintiff was trying to bootstrap into a claim against the insurer as well).

The Appellate Division Reverses Sanctions Because there was no Finding of Bad Faith

The Appellate Division addressed the sanction award against the insured for frivolous litigation. [There were no sanctions against counsel.] The insurer’s attorneys had sent the insured’s counsel a letter stating the “complaint was frivolous because the release precluded … asserting any causes of action against [the eighth layer insurer].” The letter “also stated that [the] fraud claims were unsustainable because [the insured’s] representatives had acknowledged the [repair and restoration costs at issue] were not recoverable….” Despite this letter, the insured’s “counsel did not withdraw the complaint.”

A motion for attorneys’ fees and costs ensued. The insured and its counsel both asserted that they believed the claims had merit.

The trial judge found the claims frivolous on the basis that the insured’s claims had no reasonable basis in the law or equity, and there was no good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Further, the trial judge found the insured knew that the repair and restoration costs would have to come from another source, and that the excess insurers would not make their settlement contingent on recovery of those costs from another source.

The Appellate Division reversed the frivolous litigation sanctions, finding the trial court relied upon the wrong standards. The frivolous litigation statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1, which applies only to represented parties, requires a finding of bad faith on the plaintiff’s part. Here, there was no such finding. Thus, the claim failed.

The Appellate Division laid out these bad faith standards:

Where ‘a prevailing defendant’s allegation is based on the absence of a ‘reasonable basis in law or equity’ for the plaintiff’s claim and the plaintiff is represented by an attorney, an award cannot be sustained if the ‘plaintiff did not act in bad faith in asserting’ or pursuing the claim.” …. A finding of bad faith is essential because “clients generally rely on their attorneys ‘to evaluate the basis in law or equity of a claim or defenses,’ and ‘a client who relies in good faith on the advice of counsel cannot be found to have known that his or her claim or defense was baseless.’” …. Furthermore, under the FLS, the party seeking the imposition of sanctions “bears the burden of proving that the non-prevailing party acted in bad faith.” …. We have held that “a grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of a [prevailing party], without more, does not support a finding that the [non-prevailing party] filed or pursued the claim in bad faith.”

The trial court did reference Rule 1:48, which only applies to attorneys and pro se parties, and thus had no application in this matter.

Date of Decision: October 4, 2019

Fedway Assocs. v. Engle Martin & Assocs., Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division DOCKET NO. A-0297-18T4, 2019 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2048 (N.J. App. Div. Oct. 4, 2019) (Currier, Hoffman, Yannotti, JJ.) (Unpublished)


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The insured claimed the carrier breached its fiduciary duty in failing to consider his interests when settling the underlying action, leaving him exposed while other insureds were released. The court denied the insurer’s summary judgment motion.

Under New Jersey law, an insurer owes a duty of diligence and good faith in effecting settlements. This is not only a contractual duty, but also a fiduciary duty. By controlling the right to settle, the insurer bears the burden “to observe ordinary diligence in performing that power when in the exercise of it.” This is “the most urgent duty to act in good faith and with diligence in attempting to arrange a possible settlement.”

The diligence, however, is ordinary diligence not extraordinary diligence. Thus, the insurer must use “ordinary care to ascertain the facts on which its performance depends if he has not already done so.” “This duty [is] of particular importance [when] the insured [i]s personally liable for any damages in excess of the policy limit.” Proving this breach of good faith only requires proving a breach of fiduciary duty, without additionally proving malice or will.

In this case, material issues of fact remained and summary judgment was not appropriate. The court did not follow the insurer’s focus on its lack of a duty to protect all insureds, where the non-settling insured claimed the carrier knew or should have known about his exposure as an indemnitor, thus demonstrating a lack of diligence. The court agreed that discovery into the insurer’s settlement of the underlying claim, and expert testimony, were still needed; and that the ultimate issue was one for the factfinder on a full factual record.

Date of Decision: April 2, 2019

Ware Industries v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., U. S. District Court District of New Jersey Civ. No. 18-13895 (WHW)(CLW), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57399 (D.N.J. April 2, 2019) (Walls, J.)

The court subsequently denied a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing in Ware Industries v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., U. S. District Court District of New Jersey, Civ. No. 18-13895 (WHW)(CLW), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94123 (D.N.J. June 5, 2019) (Walls, J.)


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This case addresses a wide array of New Jersey bad faith issues. The underlying facts involve disputed coverage and defense obligations in a suit against the insured based on the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA).

The insurer withdrew its defense based on trial court finding no coverage, which was later reversed on appeal

The insurer had been defending under a reservation of rights, but withdrew the defense when the trial court ruled no coverage was due. The underlying case proceeded. A $19 million judgment was entered on an unopposed summary judgment motion against the insured.

Subsequently, the appellate division reversed the trial court’s coverage ruling, and remanded to explore further factual issues before determining the coverage question.

The insured assigned it claims to the underlying plaintiffs, who counterclaimed for bad faith and failure to settle within policy limits, and who also intervened in the coverage dispute again alleging bad faith. Before reaching a jury in the declaratory judgment action, the court dismissed the bad faith claims “except for the count in its counterclaim that alleged [the insurer] acted in bad faith by failing to settle the underlying action at a time when it controlled that litigation and could have settled the claim within …  policy limits.”

The jury found for the insured on coverage, and the court further awarded attorney’s fees under R. 4:42-9(a)(6). The total award exceeded $5 million.

On appeal, the court went through the relevant policy language and exclusions in great detail. Among other issues addressed, it found the verdict should have been reversed on the issue of what constituted “property damage,” with a single exception, that was also the sole actionable occurrence. Thus, the judgment was significantly undermined on appeal.

Bad faith issues

The court then addressed a variety of bad faith issues. This was triggered by the insurer’s late effort on the eve of trial to renew an attempt to dismiss the bad faith failure to settle claims for failure to bring forth expert testimony to support the failure to settle claim.

The insured “objected to the untimeliness of the motion and requested an adjournment if the court was inclined to dismiss for lack of an expert.” The judge found that there was no actionable bad faith claim under the “fairly debatable standard”, and that the insured had failed to negotiate a reasonable settlement once the defense was withdrawn.

“Alternatively, the judge found that any assessment of [the insurer’s] conduct in this complex case was beyond the ken of the average juror and dismissed the bad faith failure to settle claim because [the insured] had no expert. Noting the case management order required [the insured] to furnish an expert report nearly one year earlier, she denied any adjournment and dismissed the bad faith failure to settle counterclaim.”

The Appellate Division agreed an expert was necessary, but reversed the trial court’s ruling. It found that the motion in limine was functionally a summary judgment motion that was untimely and prejudicial.

The Court then addressed the nature of New Jersey bad faith claims, and the standards applicable in first and third party contexts.

Standards for failure to settle within policy limits

The failure to settle a third party claim within policy limits is governed by the New Jersey Supreme Court’s Rova Farms decision. Because the insurer controls the settlement, it has a fiduciary obligation to exercise good faith in considering settlement. The decision not to settle within policy limits “must be a thoroughly honest, intelligent and objective” decision.

“It must be a realistic one when tested by the necessarily assumed expertise of the company. This expertise must be applied, in a given case, to a consideration of all the factors bearing upon the advisability of a settlement for the protection of the insured. While the view of the carrier or its attorney as to liability is one important factor, a good faith evaluation requires more. It includes consideration of the anticipated range of a verdict, should it be adverse; the strengths and weaknesses of all of the evidence to be presented on either side so far as known; the history of the particular geographic area in cases of similar nature; and the relative appearance, persuasiveness, and likely appeal of the claimant, the insured, and the witnesses at trial.”

Expert needed on bad faith claim to assist jury

Rejecting a settlement by itself does not constitute bad faith. There must be “an assessment of the reasonableness of an insurer’s settlement negotiations in the underlying action” and this assessment “will likely hinge upon the credibility of fact witnesses, as well as expert testimony as to what went wrong on the settlement front and why.”

In this case, the factors were varied and complicated, and expert testimony was necessary to assist the jury in making a bad faith decision under Rova Farms and its progeny. Thus, the trial court was right on the issue that an expert was needed.

Some advice of how to handle late raised issues that will be allowed to go to trial, and the ability to sever bad faith claims

In reversing the dismissal, the appellate judges gave some practical advice to trial courts under these circumstances. Either the trial court have been adjourned to allow time to obtain the expert testimony and response, or the bad faith claim could have been severed and tried after the coverage case. The case was remanded for the trial judge to address the bad faith claim.

Some advice of using “fairly debatable” standard (Pickett) in failure to settle cases (Rova Farms)

The appellate judges then stated they would not address the issue of whether the trial judge’s fairly debatable ruling as a basis for dismissal was proper. The court then went on to discuss the interplay of Rova Farms and the Pickett fairly debatable standard at some length. It observed that the fairly debatable standard arose in the first party context, and that Rova Farms addressed failure to settle third party claims.

The Appellate Division had previously ruled that the fiduciary duty implicated in the third party failure to settle context does not exist in the first party context. However, another Appellate Division panel had ruled that the fairly debatable standard did apply in third party coverage cases (as differentiated from failure to settle cases). Thus, “[n]o reported New Jersey decision has addressed whether Pickett‘s ‘reasonably debatable’ standard applies to an insured’s bad faith refusal to settle claim.”

The Third Circuit has addressed the issue, and found that the Rova Farms’ standards, rather than the Pickett fairly debatable standards should control third party failure to settle claims.

“Whether [the insured] would be held liable for [the third-party’s] injuries was “fairly debatable,” but in the context of a third-party claim with a possibility of an excess verdict, Pickett supplies only part of the equation. The “fairly debatable” standard is analogous to the probability liability will attach in a third-party claim, but it does not consider the likelihood of an excess verdict.

A third-party claim that may exceed the policy limit creates a conflict of interest in that the limit can embolden the insurer to contest liability while the insured is indifferent to any settlement within the limit. This conflict is not implicated when the insured is a first-party beneficiary, where the claimant and the insurer are in an adversarial posture and the possibility of an excess verdict is absent.

Rova Farms, not Pickett, protects insureds who are relegated to the sidelines in third-party litigation from the danger that insurers will not internalize the full expected value of a claim due to a policy cap.”

The present panel chose to decide the issue, though (no pun intended), it acknowledged “the appeal of the Third Circuit’s rationale. An insurer who, while exclusively controlling the litigation, acts in bad faith and refuses to settle a third-party claim within its insured’s policy limits exposes the insured to personal liability. The situation therefore presents different concerns from those posed by a suit where the insurer acts in bad faith and wrongfully denies contractual benefits to the insured under its policy of insurance.”

Failure to negotiate a settlement after coverage denial may not preclude a later bad faith claim

Finally, the panel rejected the trial court’s finding that the insured’s failure to negotiate a settlement once coverage was denied precluded the possibility of a later bad faith claim.

The court looked generally to case law concerning insured’s conduct in settling, or not settling, cases where the insurer has declined involvement on the basis it does not believe coverage is due. Insured are not required as a matter of law to settle at their own expense. Rather, “under certain circumstances, insureds could do so without violating policy terms where there has been a breach by the insurer.”

In sum, the panel reversed the bad faith claim dismissal and remanded the matter to proceed on the bad faith claim.

Date of Decision: July 31, 2018

Penn National Insurance Co. v. Group C Communications, Inc., New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division, DOCKET NOS. A-0754-15T1 A-0808-15T1, 2018 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1833 (N.J. App. Div. July 31, 2018) (O’Connor, Messano and Vernoia, JJ.)



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The central discussion in this case focused on the duty to defend as distinguished from the duty to reimburse. Where there is coverage on the face of the complaint a defense must be provided, with two exceptions. If there are covered and uncovered claims, or the coverage issue is of a kind that cannot be determined through the underlying action against the insured, then the obligation to defend becomes an obligation to reimburse defense costs if it is later determined coverage was due. Thus, an insurer can reserve its rights and dispute coverage, which can turn the duty to defend into a duty to reimburse.

In this case, there was a policy exclusion with anti-concurrent and anti-sequential language, when compared to the allegations in the complaint, made it premature “to order [the insurer] to assume responsibility for the defense since it was unclear, based on the anti-concurrent and anti-sequential language in the exclusion, whether any claims would be covered.” Thus, the duty to defend became a duty to reimburse.

The insured settled the claim, and sought recovery under the Griggs rule. Under Griggs: “Where an insurer wrongfully refused coverage and a defense to its insured, so that the insured is obliged to defend himself in an action later held to be covered by the policy, the insurer is liable for the amount of the judgment obtained against the insured or of the settlement made by him. The only qualifications to this rule are that the amount paid in settlement be reasonable and that the payment be made in good faith.” The Court refused to apply Griggs to this case where a duty to deny a defense and coverage was made in good faith.

Further, the insurer did not breach its duty of good faith in the steps taken to deny the claim. There was no unreasonable delay in denying the claim, and no purported to prejudice the insured.

This opinion provides a good overview of New Jersey law on policy interpretation and coverage disputes, coverage disputes involving exclusions, and anti-concurrent/anti-sequential clauses.

Date of Decision: July 20, 2018

Wear v. Selective Insurance Co., New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division, DOCKET NO. A-5526-15T1 A-0033-16T1, 2018 N.J. Super. LEXIS 108 (App. Div. July 20, 2018) (Koblitz, Manahan, Suter, JJ.)


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This appeal stems from an underlying UIM action that involved a 2012 automobile accident. The insured settled with the underinsured-tortfeasor for $15,000 and filed a UIM claim with the insurer. After settlement negotiations failed, the insured filed suit against the insurer, and each party then filed an offer of judgment. The insurer offered $30,000 and the insured’s offer of judgment amounted to $85,000. Policy limits were $100,000.

The jury ultimately returned a verdict for $375,000. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict for $360,000 plus interest after subtracting the initial $15,000 settlement without prejudice to either party’s right to file a post-judgment motion for molding or other relief. The insurer filed a motion to mold the verdict to the policy limits. The insured filed a motion to amend the complaint to add a bad faith claim and for counsel fees.

The trial court denied the insured’s motion to amend, but allowed her to file a new complaint asserting a bad faith claim. As to the insurer’s motion to mold to the $100,000 policy limit, the trial court stated that it had discretion not to mold the verdict because the insurer engaged in “scorched earth” settlement practices. Lastly, the trial court awarded the insured counsel fees on the non-molded verdict, per the offer of judgment rule.

On appeal, the Appellate Division ruled that the trial court erred in declining to mold the verdict. The Court primarily relied upon case law that commands molding the verdict, because “UIM cases are first-party contract claims against insurers, but they are generally tried as if they were third-party tort actions with the insurer standing in for the uninsured or underinsured tortfeasor . . . . Thus, courts have appropriately recognized the need to mold jury verdicts in these cases to reflect the rights and duties of the parties under the insurance policy.”

The Appellate Division added that the trial court erred in molding the verdict based upon the insurer’s alleged bad faith, when the issue of bad faith had never been pleaded or adjudicated. It rejected the idea of deciding the bad faith issue without giving both parties the opportunity to litigate the issue.

The Appellate Division did affirm the insured’s right to counsel fees under the offer of judgment rule, however, the sum awarded was in error because the fee application submitted to the trial court was deficient. The Appellate Division stated that “a fee application must ‘be supported by an affidavit of services addressing the factors enumerated by RPC 1.5(a)’ and must include a specific enumeration of the services performed and the hours spent.”

The Appellate Division remanded the action back to the trial court for the various reasons articulated.

Date of Decision: December 14, 2017

Seamon v. State Farm Ins. Co., DOCKET NO. A-0293-16T3, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3069 (New Jersey Appellate Division Dec. 14, 2017) (Reisner and Gilson, JJ.)


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This opinion is the culmination of over a decade of litigation, originating in an April 2000 automobile accident. Nancy Palmer, as assignee of the insured-tortfeasor, brought suit against the tortfeasor’s insurer after a three-day trial in August 2004, which resulted in a $460,000 award in Palmer’s favor. The insured-tortfeasor had a $300,000 policy limit.

Prior to filing the underlying lawsuit, Palmer’s attorney made a demand to the insurer for $40,000. The insurer responded that it was not going to engage in any settlement talks, because it did not believe Palmer could meet her burden under New Jersey’s Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act, which required a heightened burden of proof for Palmer to recover non-economic damages. After filing the underlying lawsuit, Palmer reduced her demand amount, and an arbitrator entered a non-binding award of $22,500. The insurer rejected this arbitration award, and demanded a trial de novo, which led to the $460,000 verdict.

The insurer unsuccessfully appealed the $460,000 result, and ultimately paid Palmer. Thereafter, the insured-tortfeasor assigned Palmer the right to bring a bad faith claim against the insurer.

After an August 2015 non-jury trial, the trial court ruled that Palmer failed to meet her burden to show that the insurer acted in bad faith, either before the jury verdict or thereafter. Palmer appealed the trial court’s decision, and argued (1) the insurer’s claims handling activities violated its duty to exercise due care in protecting its insured; (2) the insurer failed to employ proper expertise in both investigating and negotiating settlement of the claim; (3) the insurer violated the law in appealing the August 2004 verdict without a reasonable probability of reversal; (4) the insurer failed to put the insured’s interests first; (5) the insurer failed to pursue all available settlement avenues; and (6) the trial judge misinterpreted the law and the evidence.

The Appellate Division disagreed, and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court ruled that the trial judge was owed considerable deference in “her critical finding that [the insurer] did convey an offer to settle the case for the policy limits while the appeal of the jury verdict was still pending.” Furthermore, the jury verdict in excess of the policy limits was neither reasonably anticipated nor reflective of Palmer’s own settlement demands. Lastly, the Appellate Division wrote, “we accept the judge’s finding that the insurer’s delay in making the post-verdict offer was neither reflective of bad faith nor that it produced appreciable prejudice to . . . the insured, beyond the happenstance of the excess verdict itself.”

Date of Decision: December 14, 2017

Palmer v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co., DOCKET NO. A-0854-15T3, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3060 (New Jersey Appellate Division Dec. 14, 2017) (Sabatino, Ostrer, and Whipple, JJ.)



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This case provides an exposition of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under Rova Farms, in the context of settlement negotiations where the potential loss exceeds policy limits, and the matter settled well above policy limits.

The insured rear-ended another vehicle seriously injuring that vehicle’s four passengers, who later brought suit against him. The insured’s policy limits provided $25,000 per person or $50,000 per accident, but the documented value of the injury claims alleged far exceeded those limits. The personal injury action eventually settled, with a consent judgment against the insured for $1.155 million dollars.

Prior to that settlement, the personal injury plaintiffs’ counsel made a policy limits settlement demand on the tortfeasor’s insurer. Eleven months later, and after an arbitration award against the insured for $1.3 million, the insurer belatedly tendered its policy limits. Plaintiffs’ counsel rejected this offer, and counteroffered to settle for the policy limits, adding a demand for an assignment of the insured’s breach of good faith and fair dealing against the insurer. The insurer rejected this counteroffer.

The personal injury plaintiffs and the insured subsequently settled by agreeing to a consent judgment in the amount of $1.155 million, with a further agreement that the insured would pursue a bad faith claim against its insurer.

As agreed, the insured brought a bad faith complaint. He alleged the insurer failed to respond to the settlement offer; failed to seek an extension of time to reply to the offer; and that the insurer negligently or intentionally failed to advise the insured of the settlement offer that was within the available policy limits. The insurer sought to dismiss the claim, and the trial court denied that motion.

On appeal, the Appellate Division stated that insurers have “a positive fiduciary duty to take the initiative and attempt to negotiate a settlement within the policy coverage[,]” and “[a]n insurer’s fiduciary duty requires it ‘to make an honest, intelligent and good faith evaluation of the case for settlement purposes and to weigh the probabilities in a fair manner.’”

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the appellate court would not rule on the issue of a putative collusive settlement, but recited the rule that an insurer could be bound to pay on a settlement sum that was reasonable and made in good faith.

It held the bad faith complaint alleged sufficient facts and circumstances to make out a bad faith claim, by alleging that the insurer did not look to the insured’s interests and take the initiative in attempting to negotiate a settlement offer for its insured within the policy limits.

In dicta, the appellate court stated that there were potential issues on the collusion allegations that the trial court may have to allow the insurer to explore. “We add that Insurance Council’s [sic] assertion the settlement was a product of collusion and bad faith raises some interesting issues. One interpretation of the settlement agreement is that the personal injury plaintiffs will file warrants of satisfaction immediately upon conclusion of this bad faith action, regardless of the outcome. That construction suggests that if plaintiffs recover nothing under the bad faith action, the personal injury plaintiffs will collect nothing further… If that is so, then there is a significant question as to whether [the insured] will ever have to pay a sum in excess of the policy limits. Resolution of that issue may have a bearing on the viability of plaintiffs’ bad faith cause of action. We express no opinion as to that issue. The trial court may decide to conduct discovery and entertain dispositive motions on that issue before permitting the parties to engage in other extensive discovery. We leave that matter to the trial court’s sound discretion.”

Date of Decision: July 20, 2017

Ellington v. Cure Auto Ins., No. A-2470-16T4, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1831 (N.J. Ct. App. July 20, 2017) (Currier, Geiger, Nugent, JJ.) (Unpublished)