Archive for the 'PA – Claims Handling (reasonable)' Category


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There were two bad faith claims arising out of a building’s wall collapse case. The first was over whether any coverage was due in connection with building walls that had not collapsed, for which the insured sought replacement to match restoration of the collapsed wall. The second had to do with whether the carrier owed additional damage payments for claims more directly related to the collapse.

The court determined no coverage was due for the other walls, and granted summary judgment on that coverage issue. Because no coverage was due, the court necessarily found “no basis for a bad faith claim based upon an unreasonable denial of coverage.”

Second, the court observed the parties’ experts disagreed on the scope of damages and amount due concerning the wall collapse. The court granted summary judgment on bad faith on this claim as well, finding insurer reasonably relied on its experts in determining the amount of damages it would pay.

The court stated:

As regards additional payment of damages, [the insured] argues that disagreements between the parties’ experts precludes the entry of summary judgment on the bad faith claim. Courts have held that “an insurer’s reasonable reliance on an engineering expert’s report for a coverage decision does not constitute bad faith.” Hamm v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 908 F.Supp.2d 656, 673 (W.D.Pa.2012) (citing El Bor Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 787 F.Supp.2d 341, 349 (E.D.Pa.2011) (insurance company’s reliance on engineer’s findings as a basis for denial of coverage provides reasonable grounds to deny benefits)) “Moreover, even if the expert incorrectly assessed the cause of damage, this is not evidence that his conclusions were unreasonable or that Defendant acted unreasonably in relying upon them.” Totty v. Chubb Corp., 455 F.Supp.2d 376, 390 (W.D.Pa.2006) (citing Pirino v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 3:04CV698, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27519, 2005 WL 2709014, at *5 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 21, 2005)).

Here, [the insured] only identifies conflicts amongst the expert’s opinions on causation and damages and not the reasonableness of [the carrier’s] expert opinions. The conflict between experts may preclude summary judgment on other claims, but not for bad faith. Based upon the reasonableness standard in the bad faith statute coupled with the high burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence, the Court concludes that a reasonable juror could not find bad faith in [the insured’s] favor. …

Date of Decision: May 14, 2019

Keyser v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., U. S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania 2:18-CV-00226-MJH, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81194 (W.D. Pa. May 14, 2019) (Horan, J.)


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Offering a different take on the usual challenge to federal pleadings, the insurer moved to strike portions of this UIM bad faith complaint as immaterial and impertinent, rather than to dismiss the entire complaint.

The complaint pleaded the insurer’s alleged refusal to pay full medical benefits, and the alleged consequences of that refusal vis-à-vis the insured and third parties. The insurer focused its motion on striking four specific paragraphs of the complaint.

The first two paragraphs raised the insurer’s advertisements directed to members of the military. The insured, a long serving Army veteran, alleged that he relied on representations and warranties made in these advertisements, which the insurer breached. The court agreed to strike these two paragraphs as irrelevant to the issue of whether the insurer breached a duty under the policy itself, or violated the bad faith statute. In addition, the court found these warranty averments prejudicial, as they could lead a jury to believe the insurer owed duties outside the policy.

The court, however, refused to strike the other two paragraphs at issue.

One of these paragraphs included an averment that the insurer refused to pay a benefit due, while also mentioning grievances directed at third parties. The alleged refusal to pay the insured was enough to preserve this paragraph, even though the allegations regarding third parties may not be actionable.

As to the final paragraph at issue, the insurer took the position that the injuries at issue did not arise from the accident. The insured argued the ramifications of this erroneous position posed a variety of detriments to him, with simultaneous advantages to the insurer. While the paragraph did have some focus on contingent future conduct, it still alleged the insurer had already refused to pay for medical treatment, and how this refusal might be used by the insurer to its advantage in limiting payments or evidence. The court held: “These averments could bear some possible relation to whether Defendant … breached a duty owed under the Policy or imposed by Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute. See Rancosky v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 642 Pa. 153, 170 A.3d 364, 365 (Pa. 2017) (finding that evidence of an insurance company’s motive of self-interest or ill-will may be probative of a bad faith claim).”

Date of Decision: May 6, 2018

Bacon v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania No. 1:18-cv-01686, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76218, 2019 WL 1988214 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2019) (Kane, J.)


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In this UIM case, the insured settled with the other driver for $50,000. The insurer initially determined the injury at issue did not arise from the accident, based on an IME. The insured later aggravated the injury, and his doctor determined the original injury was from the first accident.

The insured demanded the full UIM policy limits ($100,000). The insurer offered $7,500(considering $50,000 had already been paid). Over the next ten months, the insurer increased the offer six times, ultimately paying the $100,000 policy limit.

The insured sued for bad faith. After a six-day bench trial, the trial court found no bad faith under the Pennsylvania statute. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.

The appellate court relied upon the following trial court findings in upholding the defense verdict:

  1. “In this case, the trial court found that [the insurer] never denied Appellant’s claim.”

  2. “Instead, it determined that ‘[b]y all accounts … [the] investigation was vigorous; [the insurer] sought and received numerous medical records, ordered independent medical examinations and sought to reconcile often conflicting or changing information, all the time communicating with [the insured] and his attorney.’”

  3. “It further opined that ‘the ten-month negotiation period under examination cannot be deemed unreasonable’ where it was ‘undisputed that [the insured’s] treatment was off-again and on-again throughout this period, substantiating [the insurer’s] observation that [the insured’s] claim, from a medical standpoint, was a ‘fluid file’ with ongoing developments that complicated the evaluation process.’”

  4. “As such, the trial court concluded that at ‘[e]ach step of the way, [the insurer] acknowledged and credited new information and responded accordingly [during the tenth month period].”

  5. “The trial court also methodically details the procedural timeline of [the insurer’s] six increasing offers based upon the information as it became available … over the 10-month time period involved.”

Date of Decision: April 18, 2019

Camiolo v. Erie Insurance Exchange, Superior Court of Pennsylvania No. 478 EDA 2018, 2019 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1456 (Pa. Super. Ct. April 18, 2019) (Dubow, Olson, Stevens, JJ.)


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Three April 2019 decisions out of Pennsylvania’s Eastern District bring up the ongoing issue of whether alleged Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA) violations may be used in any manner to establish statutory bad faith claims under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371. We also discussed this issue in a February 2019 post that can be found here.

Case holding UIPA violations may be used to prove bad faith

In the April 3, 2019 Blease decision, the court relied heavily on the UIPA in finding the insured adequately pleaded a statutory bad faith case. That opinion is summarized here.

In particular, the court looked to the UIPA code sections governing 45-day status notices when the claim is not resolved within 30 days. Relying on Pennsylvania Superior Court precedent, the Blease Court stated: “This Court further notes that a plaintiff seeking damages for an insurer’s bad faith conduct under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371 may attempt to prove bad faith by demonstrating that the insurer has violated one or more provisions of related Pennsylvania insurance statutes or regulations, even if they do not independently provide for private causes of action.”

It is not wholly clear whether this means a UIPA violation may be used as evidence of a statutory bad faith claim, or whether the violation constitutes definitive proof, in and of itself, to establish at least the first prong of the Terletsky/Rancosky bad faith test (unreasonableness).

Case holding UIPA provides an evidentiary yardstick for bad faith cases

On April 23, 2019, another Eastern District Court issued a detailed opinion granting partial summary judgment to the insured, by holding that the insurer acted in bad faith during a very specific period of time. The court left other issues of bad faith, and other time periods, to the jury.

In Shawnee Tabernacle Church v. GuideOne, the court carried out a close factual analysis showing no dispute of material fact that the claim adjusters acted unreasonably and in bad faith in delaying the claim handling process over a period of many months, where there was no excuse for denying coverage or promptly responding to the insured. Thus, the court stated: “As a matter of law, I find that [the insurer] acted in bad faith when it abandoned the investigation and resolution of Plaintiffs’ claim between June 16, 2015 and October 5, 2015, and then further delayed a determination of coverage until December 11, 2015, despite the fact that it possessed all relevant information about the vacancy provision once the EUOs were complete.”

Following Rancosky, the court observed that the insured need not prove ill-will or self-interest to establish statutory bad faith. Moreover, relying on Pennsylvania Superior Court precedent, the court found that “bad faith may include ‘lack of good faith investigation into fact[s], and failure to communicate with the claimant,’ both of which certainly occurred in this case between June and December. … ‘Similarly, a delay in investigation of a claim may constitute bad faith where it involves [i]nexcusable periods of inactivity, unreasonable assumptions, and inadequate communication.’ Here, [the insurer] has offered no excuse for the inactivity with respect to coverage between June 16 and December 11, and it engaged in little to no communication with Plaintiffs about the coverage issue during the same period.”

Getting to the UIPA, again citing Superior Court precedent, the court found that “[t]he lack of communication is a violation of Section 146.7(c)(1) of Title 31 of the Pennsylvania Code, which requires a report to the insured every 45 days explaining the reasons for delay in resolving a claim. Although such a violation does not establish bad faith per se, it constitutes relevant evidence. But Section 146.7(c)(1) has relevance beyond the obligation to communicate. By specifying the frequency with which a carrier must report to its insured, it provides an objective yardstick recognized by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department as to what constitutes a reasonable interval within which a carrier should be able to address the merits of a claim. From mid-June through mid-December, four full intervals elapsed without resolution or explanation, even as [the insured] faced financial peril. This further supports the conclusion that [the insurer’s] conduct was reckless during this period and constituted bad faith.”

UIPA violations cannot be used as evidence of statutory bad faith

By contrast, also on April 23, 2019, a third Eastern District Judge appears to deny any role for the UIPA in determining a statutory bad faith claim. The decision in Horn v. Minnesota Life Insurance Company can be found here. To quote that decision:

At Count IV, Plaintiff asserts that the handling of her claim under the Policy constituted bad faith, thus, entitling her to damages under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371. Plaintiff contends that [the insurer] acted in bad faith by, inter alia, denying her claim, engaging in misleading marketing practices, failing to communicate regularly about its investigation, and acting in a manner prohibited by the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (“UIPA”), 40 Pa. Stat. § 1171.1 et seq. “To prevail on a bad faith claim, the insured must prove two elements: ‘(1) that the insurer did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy; and (2) that the insurer knew of or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable basis in denying the claim.'” U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Kelman Bottles, 538 F. App’x 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Babayan, 430 F.3d 121, 137 (3d Cir. 2005)). The insured must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, and “the insured’s burden in opposing a summary judgment motion brought by the insurer is commensurately high.” Babayan, 430 F.3d at 137 (internal quotations omitted). Here, this Court finds that [the insurer] had a reasonable basis for denying benefits; namely, [the insured’s] premium had not been paid, and the grace period described in the Policy had expired at the time of [the insured’s] death. As such, Plaintiff cannot prove the first element of her bad faith claim, and summary judgment is granted with respect to that claim.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ bad faith is evidenced by their alleged violation of the UTPCPL and “insurance regulations” such as the UIPA and the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices regulations (“UCSP”), 31 Pa. Code §§ 146.1-146.10. However, Plaintiff is mistaken as these claims fail as a matter of law. See Leach v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 262 F. App’x 455, 459 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that “insofar as [plaintiff’s] claim for bad faith was based upon an alleged violation of the UIPA, it failed as a matter of law.”); Dinner v. U.S. Auto. Ass’n Cas. Ins. Co., 29 F. App’x 823, 827 (3d Cir. 2002); (“it is apparent from a comparison of bad faith standard [that the Pennsylvania Superior Court] adopted with the provisions of the UIPA and the UCSP that much of the conduct proscribed by the latter is wholly irrelevant” to the bad faith analysis); Watson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118873, 2011 WL 4894073, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2011) (observing that, since the current bad faith standard was established in Terletsky, “courts in the [Third] circuit have . . . refused to consider UIPA violations as evidence of bad faith.”). Therefore, summary judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiff’s claim of bad faith.

A link to other UIPA cases summarized on this Blog can be found here.

Copies of these April 2019 opinions can be found here:

Blease v. Geico Casualty Co., U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-3893, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57145 (E.D. Pa. April 3, 2019) (Jones, II, J.)

Shawnee Tabernacle Church v. GuideOne Insurance, U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION No. 16-5728, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68442 (E.D. Pa. April 23, 2019) (McHugh, J.)

Horn v. Minnesota Life Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-238, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69016 (E.D. Pa. April 23, 2019) (Quiñones Alejandro, J.)


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In this homeowner’s case, the insured attempted to tie a fallen tree to water pipe damage. The court laid out a detailed history of the insurer’s responses to the insured’s claims and communications, demonstrating the insurer’s active role in investigating the claim. The court also detailed the carriers’ review of documents and information from the insured’s contractors. The court found the insured’s communications and investigation timely and reasonable.

Further, the insured was contractually obligated to show property damage resulting from a covered event, but failed to do so, e.g., there were no photographs of the fallen tree, nor sufficient evidence of how the tree could have damaged concrete encased pipes. Under the circumstances, the insured “had to retain a contractor to provide a report making the connection.”

Moreover, the insured’s “plumbing and heating contractors both testified the fallen tree did not cause the pipe damage, rather, the pipes needed to be replaced because of their age.” On these facts, the carrier could not be expected to “make payments on claims devoid of some evidence linking damage to an event.”

In light of the delineated efforts by the insurer to investigate the claim, and the insured’s failure to produce evidence of the necessary connection between the fallen tree and the pipe damage, the court granted summary judgment on the bad faith claim.

Date of Decision: March 29, 2019

Mitchell v. Allstate Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-1806, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55613, 2019 WL 1440043 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2019) (Kearney, J.)


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This case involves two bases for coverage denials: (1) late notice resulting in prejudice, and (2) first party claims are not covered under a commercial general liability policy.

The bad faith plaintiff is a general contractor. It was named as an additional insured on a subcontractor’s policy with the defendant insurer.

There was an explosion resulting in personal injury to a third party, and first party property damage to the contractor. The contractor was named as a defendant in the personal injury action, and claimed over against other parties, including the named insured subcontractor. The contractor also brought a property damage suit against others, including the subcontractor, for its own property damages.

Nearly 3½ years into the personal injury suit, the parties mediated a settlement. The contractor did not request a defense or indemnity from the insurer in the personal injury action until the day that suit settled. For the first time, during that mediation, the additional insured contractor orally requested a defense and indemnification from the defendant insurer.

A representative of the contractor’s own primary insurer was present at the mediation as well as a representative of the defendant insurer. However, the defendant insurer’s representative had only come to the mediation to represent the subcontractor’s interests, not the contractor’s interests.

There is no bad faith when the claim is plainly outside the scope of coverage.

The court readily found no coverage due for the contractor’s own property damage claims. The contractor was seeking coverage as an additional insured under the subcontractor’s CGL policy. CGL policies only apply to property damage claims raised by others against an insured, not to the insured’s own property damages.

An “insurer does not act in bad faith when the insurer does not breach its duty to defend or indemnify.” The property damage claim “was plainly outside the scope of coverage”. Thus, as there was no duty to defend or indemnify there could be no bad faith, and summary judgment was granted on both the first party property damage coverage and bad faith claims.

There could be no bad faith where late notice and prejudice also resulted in a coverage denial.

After extensive analysis, Judge Hornak concluded that there was no coverage due in the personal injury action because of the contractor’s late notice, and the actual prejudice resulting from the late notice. He granted the insurer’s summary judgment motion on any duty to defend or indemnify. The insurer lost the opportunity to retain counsel and pay a fee structure significantly less expensive than what was charged by the contractor’s counsel; lost “the opportunity to take control of the matter at an early stage and resolve it prior to the accumulation of those expenses”; lost the opportunity to advance potential defenses; and “was indisputably prejudiced by its inability to control [the] defense, or the costs incurred in furtherance of it, until the end of the underlying litigation—when [the contractor] expected payment for all of the expenses that they had accumulated up to that point along with what it ‘fronted’ for settlement.”

Absent that late notice and prejudice, there is no question the insurer had a duty to defend the personal injury claim against the contractor. Still, as no coverage was due because of the late notice and prejudice, there could be no bad faith under the same principles used in rejecting the bad faith claim on property damage, i.e., no coverage due = no bad faith.

However, the court went on to analyze the personal injury bad faith claim, assuming arguendo what would have happened if it allowed the issue of prejudice to go to the jury instead of granting summary judgment. Judge Hornak concluded that even under those circumstances, he would have rejected the bad faith claim. There was simply no basis in the record to show the insurer’s refusal to step in at the mediation, or its ongoing refusal to pay the contractor, was frivolous or unfounded.

The following facts were undisputed, and showed the insurer acted reasonably in believing it was prejudiced by late notice and would not have to provide any defense or indemnity payments. It did not choose counsel; the contractor had amassed years of legal fees and expenses over which the insurer had no control; the insurer “was not provided an accounting of the defense costs for which it would potentially have to indemnify” the contractor; the insurer “did not participate in early investigation or settlement discussions”; and the insurer “had no reason, until the moment that the oral demand was made, to believe that [the contractor] desired a defense or expected indemnification”.

The court also found it nonsensical to conclude the insurer could have made a decision in the midst of the mediation to provide indemnification and pay a settlement, or even could have stopped the mediation at which it was protecting the named insured’s interests. This was highlighted by the fact that the case had been going on for years, and the contractor had never before asked for defense or indemnification. Moreover, at that moment in time there remained legitimate coverage issues reasonably justifying a refusal to pay on demand.

Finally, the insurer’s ongoing refusal to pay for the subcontractor’s legal fees and settlement payment also had a reasonable foundation, and could not be deemed frivolous or unfounded. Thus, summary judgment on bad faith was granted even assuming it would not have been granted on the coverage claim.

Date of Decision: March 1, 2019

NVR, Inc. v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania No. 2:16-cv-00722, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32802, 2019 WL 989393 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2019) (Hornak, J.)


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The insurer successfully obtained summary judgment despite its continued refusal to reimburse its insured the sum actually paid to repair property damage.

The policy covered fire damage to the insured’s motel. However, coverage was limited to the least expensive of the following three options: “(1) the applicable insurance limit; (2) the cost to replace with property ‘[o]f comparable material and quality’ and ‘used for the same purpose;’ or, (3) ‘[t]he amount actually spent that is necessary to repair or replace the lost or damaged property.’” The building’s coverage limit was $2.25 Million.

Fire damaged the hotel, and the insurer paid approximately $1.6 Million. The insured claimed the loss exceeded $2.25 million, and that the insurer acted in bad faith by not reimbursing sums actually paid to repair the motel. The insured’s argument boiled down to: (a) the loss was covered; (b) the insured actually paid more than $2.25 Million to contractors, which could be proven through invoices, etc.; (c) and the insurer only paid $1.6 Million to the insured even though the insured demonstrably paid more than $2.25 Million.

The insurer offered evidence from third party contractors that the repair work could have been done at less expense, and used that as its basis to pay less than what the insured actually paid. The court found that the insurer’s payment theory comported with one of the three permissible options in the policy, i.e., the cost to replace with property of comparable material and quality. The insured’s unqualified demand for full reimbursement misread the policy.

Thus, “the Policy allows room for disagreement between the parties as to whether the invoices Plaintiff submitted were more than the ‘cost to replace’ with property of ‘comparable material and quality’—and as a result [the insurer’s] failure to fully compensate the claimed loss is not evidence of bad faith.”

Further, the insured failed to present any evidence beyond the payment invoices. Those invoices did not create any issues of material fact as to the insurer’s bad faith. Simply failing to pay what an insured demands is not bad faith where express policy language allows for a different standard of payment.

Date of Decision: February 12, 2019

Purvi, LLC v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-822, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22774, 2019 WL 558195 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2019) (Beetlestone, J.)


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An “entrustment” exclusion precluded coverage in this property damage case. After the court’s lengthy analysis reaching this conclusion, it addressed the insured’s bad faith claims. Notably, neither party briefed the bad faith issue, even though the insurer moved for summary judgment on that claim as well as the breach of contract claim.

The court readily granted judgment on the bad faith claim, stating: “The record is devoid of any evidence that Defendant denied coverage to Plaintiff in bad faith and, what is more, the Court has already determined that Defendant’s denial of coverage was proper based on the entrustment exclusion of the Policy. Accordingly, there is no basis for finding that Defendant acted in bad faith, and summary judgment is appropriate.”

Date of Decision: January 25, 2019

KA Together, Inc. v. Aspen Specialty Insurance Co., U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-142, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12184, 2019 WL 325319 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2019) (Slomsky, J.)


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This UIM bad faith case involved the insurer’s refusal to pay based on whether a college-aged child was a “resident relative” under her parents’ policy.

In addressing a motion to dismiss the bad faith claim, the court observed that “the party bringing the bad faith claim must describe who, what, where, when, and how the alleged bad faith conduct occurred.” Insurers do not act in bad faith simply by investigating claims to protect their interest during litigation, absent evidence of some dishonest purpose. In this case, the pleadings were conclusory and did not provide this detail.

The bad faith claim was “unsupported by any facts that explain how the alleged bad faith conduct occurred. Indeed, there are no specific facts showing how Plaintiff lacked a reasonable basis in its interpretation, administration, investigation, or delay of UIM benefits….” The allegations that the insurer “unreasonably investigated” the claim were unsupported by facts indicating how the insurer’s claim handling procedures were deficient. Claims about delays failed to set forth the dates of any actions that could show delays were unreasonable. Further, arguments over “obstructive tactics” used to force an “inadequate settlement” lacked specifics in identifying those tactics and did not set out a plausible claim.

The court did give leave to file an amended pleading.

Date of Decision: December 7, 2018

Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Das, U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-1613, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206787, 2018 WL 6435332 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2018) (Jones, J.)


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In this UIM bad faith case, the insured asserted that (1) the insurer failed to provide a reasonable basis for its valuation of plaintiff’s claim, and (2) the insurer refused to negotiate in good faith. The court recited a detailed history of: medical examinations, medical history and treatment (or absence thereof); the parties’ negotiations – during which plaintiff never lowered its policy limits demand; and the details of a high/low arbitration that ultimately resulted in the insurer paying less than policy limits, but more than its valuation.

The court granted summary judgment to the insurer. The record demonstrated the insurer came forward “with sufficient evidence to establish an absence of any genuine dispute of material fact as to its conduct in pre-arbitration dealings” with the insured. The court found that in valuing the claim, the insurer relied upon expert reports and the absence of documentation from the insured showing any surgical history for which damages might be due.

As to claim handling, investigation, and valuation, the court observed that the essence of a bad faith claim is the unreasonable and intentional/reckless denial of a benefit. While the insurer’s settlement offers were lower than the policy limit demand and the ultimate arbitration award, this cannot create bad faith per se. Rather, a low but reasonable valuation is not bad faith. The court found the insurer’s valuations reasonable based on its investigation, and the sum it was willing to pay in setting the high/low arbitration parameters.

It was also significant to the court that the insured never lowered her policy limits settlement demand. Again, an insurer is not required to automatically submit to a policy limits demand or subject itself to bad faith liability. An insurer has a duty to investigate the claim fairly and objectively in coming to a valuation, and standing alone, a refusal to pay policy limits is not evidence of bad faith or unreasonable valuation. An insurer may even “aggressively investigate and protect its interests in the normal course of litigation” absent doing so in bad faith.

Finally, in finding an absence of bad faith, the court observed that the claim handler did in fact change her valuation over time.

Date of Decision: December 6, 2018

Rau v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania No. 3:16-CV-0359, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206343 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2018) (Mariani, J.)

Thanks to Dan Cummins of the excellent Tort Talk Blog for bringing this case to our attention.