Archive for the 'PA – Federal Pleading Adequate' Category


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This breach of contract and bad faith action outlines what a court may consider in addressing a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In this case, the documents attached to an answer were not “written instruments” that a court could consider in deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

There was an undisputed fire loss, but there was an issue of whether at least one of the insureds resided in the home at the time of the loss. If neither insured resided at the property, there would be no coverage.

The complaint alleged facts supporting the position that one of the insureds did live in the home at the time of the loss. In answering the complaint, the insurer attached that insured’s statement under oath, the insurer’s investigative report, an EMT form, and an electric usage bill. The insurer relied on the facts in these documents to argue that both insureds did not reside at the home.

The court ruled these documents could not be used in support of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found these were not the kind of “written instruments” that could be incorporated into a pleading, as contemplated by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Instead, they were “lengthy exhibits containing evidentiary matter [that] should not be attached to the pleadings.”

For example, the court observed “[e]xhibits solely containing evidentiary matter, such as depositions, are not considered ‘written instruments’ under Rule 10(c) and are typically excluded from consideration of the pleadings.”

Thus, “[b]ecause the Statements Under Oath consist of only evidentiary matters, they cannot be considered at this juncture.” The same principle applied to the investigative reports and electric bills.

Date of Decision: October 9, 2019

Bloxham v. Allstate Ins. Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania NO. 3:19-CV-0481, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175198 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2019) (Caputo, J.)


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In this Opinion, Eastern District Judge Tucker addresses a wide range of fundamental legal issues in the context of ruling on a motion to dismiss the insured’s 11 count complaint. The complaint includes not only breach of contract and bad faith claims, but tort claims, UIPA claims, declaratory judgment claims, and injunctive relief claims, all arising out of the alleged failure to pay on an insurance claim. The court also addresses a motion to remand after removal.

We do not address all of the issues Judge Tucker discusses, but highlight a few of the key principles adduced in her opinion. Her full opinion can be found here.

  1. Motion to remand denied.  (i) In determining the jurisdictional minimum amount-in-controversy, the court may consider the possibility of punitive damages under the bad faith statute. (ii) Diversity of citizenship can be established by showing the defendant is not a citizen of plaintiff’s state, just as well as by affirmatively showing the state(s) in which defendant is a citizen.

  2. The gist of the action doctrine and/or the economic loss doctrine will typically bar tort claims based on violations of an insurance contract.

  3. Violating the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA) (i) does not create a private right of action, and (ii) some courts hold it may not be used to establish violation of statutory bad faith.

As the court states: “Plaintiff’s claim is also barred to the extent that it relies on an alleged violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Insurance Practices Act (‘UIPA’) because the UIPA does not permit private recovery for a violation of its provisions. Plaintiff advances a claim for damages based, in part, on a theory that [the insurer] was negligent having breached duties imposed upon it by the UIPA, 40 Pa Const. Stat. Ann. § 1171.1, et seq. ‘Courts within the Third Circuit and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania continue to recognize [, however,] that the UIPA does not provide plaintiffs with a private cause of action.’ Tippett, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37513, 2015 WL 1345442 at *2 (quoting Weinberg v. Nationwide Cas. and Ins. Co., 949 F. Supp. 2d 588, 598 (E.D. Pa. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, in Tippett, the district court not only rejected a plaintiff’s attempt to state a separate claim under the UIPA, but also rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that proof of a UIPA violation might otherwise provide support for the plaintiff’s independent bad faith claim. Id. Plaintiff’s claim under the UIPA in this case is similarly barred.”

  1. Breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing is subsumed in the breach of contract claim.

  2. The Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law applies to the sale of insurance policies, not claims handling.

As the court states: “While Plaintiff rightly notes that the ‘UTPCPL creates a private right of action in persons upon whom unfair methods of competition and/or unfair or deceptive acts or practices are employed and who, as a result, sustain an ascertainable loss,’ … Plaintiff fails to note that ‘the UTPCPL applies to the sale of an insurance policy [but] does not apply to the handling of insurance claims.’” Thus, as the alleged “wrongful conduct under the UTPCPL relate[s] solely to [the insurer’s] actions after the execution of the homeowner’s insurance policy,” the UTPCPL claim was dismissed.

  1. Declaratory judgment count not permitted in light of breach of contract claim.

The court states: “Federal courts routinely dismiss actions seeking declaratory judgment that, if entered, would be duplicative of a judgment on an underlying breach of contract claim.” Judge Tucker cites case law for the propositions that “granting a defendant’s motion to dismiss a plaintiff’s independent cause of action for declaratory judgment because the claim for declaratory judgment was duplicative of an underlying breach of contract claim,” and “dismissing a plaintiff’s duplicative claim for declaratory judgment in the face of an underlying breach of insurance contract claim and observing that ‘pursuant to discretionary declaratory judgment authority, district courts have dismissed declaratory judgment claims at the motion to dismiss stage when they duplicate breach of contract claims within the same action.’”

  1. The insured pleads a plausible bad faith claim.

Judge Tucker highlighted the following allegations in ruling that the bad faith claim could proceed:

i the insurer “attempted to close her insurance claim despite never having sent an adjuster or inspector to evaluate the damage to the Property.”;

ii the insurer “engaged in intentional ‘telephone tag’ to delay and deny Plaintiff coverage under the homeowner’s insurance policy.”;

iii. the insurer never “scheduled an inspection of the Property or otherwise [took] any action to deny or grant coverage under the homeowner’s insurance policy.”

Thus, at the end of the day, after reviewing all of the claims and motion to remand, the insured was allowed to proceed on the breach of contract and bad faith claims.

Date of Decision: August 13, 2019

Neri v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., U. S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-0355, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136820 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2019) (Tucker, J.)


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Stating it was a close call, Middle District Magistrate Judge Carlson found the following well-pleaded allegations sufficient to set forth a plausible bad faith claim, and recommended denying a motion to dismiss without prejudice to later bringing a summary judgment motion. District Judge Mariani adopted this report and recommendation as the opinion of the court.

The Allegations

  1. Defendant … issued a policy of insurance No. K2495825 to Plaintiffs … covering their two automobiles ….

  2. Defendant … charged and collected a premium for underinsured motorist coverage on said policy.

  3. Plaintiffs … paid all premiums requested by Defendant….

  4. The same policy was in full force and effect [at the time of the auto accident at issue].

  5. On or about August 30, 2015, Plaintiff … was involved in a motor vehicle crash which directly caused him to sustain serious and severe life-threatening injuries some of which are permanent.

  6. On August 30, 2015, Plaintiff … was insured for underinsured coverage in the amount of $250,000.00, with stacking (two cars), by Defendant … under policy K2495828.

  7. As a result of the collision, Plaintiff … suffered severe and permanent injuries including, but not limited to, the following:

(a) neck sprain with severe pain and injuries to his cervical spine, more specifically identified as narrowing of disc space at the C4-C5, C5-C6 and C6-C7 with anterior and posterior osteophytes formation and narrowing of intervertebral foramina at the corresponding bilaterally with nerve root compression. Persistent multilevel degenerative spondylosis, degenerative bilateral facet edema at the C7-T1, bilateral foraminal stenosis at the C3-4, bilateral foraminal stenosis at the C4-5 and C5-6, bilateral foraminal stenosis with left foraminal disc protrusion at the C6-7, all of which pain radiates into his upper extremities;

(b) low back pain and injuries to his lumbar spine including degenerative disc disease with sharp shooting pain radiating into his left lower extremity and sciatica pain;

(c) radiculopathy and nerve injuries to the C8-T1 area;

(d) muscle spasms throughout his cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine;

(e) severe headaches;

(f) right hip pain;

(g) left ankle pain;

(h) right elbow pain; [*4]

(i) ongoing pain management, physical therapy and chiropractic treatment;

(j) ongoing and persistent pain aggravated by standing, sitting, walking, sexual activity, physical activities and elevating his arms;

(k) sleep disruption.

  1. Defendant .. was promptly notified of Plaintiff[’s] … injuries.

  2. As a result Defendant … after and only after litigation against its parent company … was initiated, began to pay and continues to pay medical payments to Plaintiff….

  3. As a result of the aforesaid incident, Plaintiff … was offered the policy limits by the operator of the 3rd party vehicle.

  4. Plaintiff … made a claim for underinsured motorist coverage with Defendant….

  5. Plaintiff …. submitted all the pertinent medical records and bills to Defendant…, indicating the serious physical and economic injuries that he sustained as a result of the crash.

  6. Defendant …refused payment to Plaintiff … of underinsured motorist benefits.

  7. Plaintiff … has performed everything required of him under the policy and is entitled to underinsured motorist benefits from Defendant….

  8. Defendant[‘s] … denial of underinsured motorist benefits was made without any reasonable basis of fact.

  9. Defendant … acted in bad faith in that it did not have a reasonable basis for denying underinsured motorist benefits under the policy and the Defendant … knew and/or recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis in denying that claim that Defendant:

(a) Failed to give equal consideration to paying the claim as to not paying the claim.

(b) Failed to objectively and fairly evaluate Plaintiff[‘s] … claim;

(c) Failed to raise a reasonable defense to not pay Plaintiff[‘s] … claim;

(d) Compelling Plaintiff … to institute arbitration to obtain underinsured motorist benefits;

(e) Defendant … engaged in dilatory and abusive claim’s handling;

(f) Unreasonably evaluating Plaintiff[‘s] … injuries and loss in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary;

(g) Failed to keep Plaintiff … fairly and adequately advised as to the status of the claim;

(h) Acting unreasonably and unfairly in response to Plaintiff[‘s] … claim;

(i) Failed to promptly provide a reasonable factual explanation of the basis for the denial of Plaintiff[‘s] … claim;

(j) Failed to conduct a fair and reasonable investigation and evaluation to Plaintiff[‘s] … claim;

(k) Defendant … violated the Unfair Claims Settlement Practice Act §146.5, 146.6, 146.7;

(l) Defendant … violated the Unfair Insurance Practice Act 40 P.S. §1171.5(a)(10) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (xi) (xii) (xiv).

The Analysis

The court found the complaint, “taken as a whole, goes beyond a mere boilerplate recital of the elements of the statute.” These allegations provided a factual chronology, and that “[despite providing [the insurer] with all pertinent medical records and bills, and fulfilling all of their policy obligations, the plaintiffs assert that [the insurer] has unreasonably refused to honor its policy obligations.” The complaint further intertwines these allegations with other bad faith averments, i.e., “unreasonable delay … in beginning to make medical payments”, and only making medical payments after suit was initiated against the insurer’s parent company, despite prompt notice of injuries well prior to suit.

While the averments are “spare,” they “go beyond the type of mere boilerplate allegations that courts have found to be too conclusory to sustain a bad faith claim.” Moreover, Magistrate Judge Carlson would not go beyond the pleadings to accept the insurer’s arguments for dismissal. The insurer asserted that the complaint should be interpreted as actually reflecting the insurer’s “prudent effort on its part to thoroughly examine and resolve a potentially meritless claim….” However, the court found “this argument invites us to go beyond the pleadings themselves and resolve essentially factual questions. This is a task which, in our view, may not be performed on consideration of a motion to dismiss, where we must simply assess the adequacy of the pleadings.”

Thus, the complaint could proceed, without prejudice to the insurer renewing its argument on summary judgment at the close of discovery.

Dates of Decision: July 19, 2019 and August 8, 2019

Vadella v. American States Ins. Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania Civil No. 3:19-CV-73, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121606 (M.D. Pa. July 19, 2019) (Carlson, M.J.) (Report and Recommendation), adopted in Vadellla v. American States Ins. Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania Civil No. 3:19-CV-73, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133764 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2019) (Mariani, J.)


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In this case, Judge Caputo found plaintiff pleaded a plausible bad faith claim.

The case involved a fatal auto injury, and the issue of whether the deceased’s father, owner of the car at issue, had an applicable policy covering the accident. The other driver was uninsured.

The carrier asked for additional information after demand was made under the father’s policy. The father sent additional information, but the carrier told him to file a complaint, so it could take discovery. The father brought UM claims, as well as breach of contract and bad faith claims.

The complaint alleged the key issue was the deceased son’s residence. The father provided numerous documents showing the son resided with him; but the carrier still declined coverage on the basis that proof of residency was lacking.

Judge Caputo rejected the carrier’s argument that the complaint amounted to boilerplate conclusory allegations of bad faith. Rather, the complaint alleged sufficient “factual matter to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion.” Specifically, “the Complaint indicate[s] that [the insurer’s] coverage decision under the Policy hinged on a determination of whether [son] resided with [father] at the time of the accident. And, upon request, [father] alleges that he provided more than ample documentation to establish that both he and [his son] resided at [the father’s home] at that time.” This included copies of a driver’s license and tax forms.

Allegedly, instead of asking for more information to fill putative gaps in this information, the carrier told father “sue us”. “Although such conduct may ultimately not amount to bad faith, it is plausible based on the factual assertions in the Complaint that [the carrier] acted in reckless disregard of its obligations under the Policy.”

Date of Decision: July 22, 2019

Fuentes v. USAA General Indemnity Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania NO. 19-CV-1111, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121362, 2019 WL 3288156 (M.D. Pa. July 22, 2019) (Caputo, J.)


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On July 1, 2019, Judge Munley issued two opinions in this UIM bad faith case: (1) finding removal proper; and (2) finding the insured pleaded a plausible bad faith case.

Removal was proper where potential punitive damages could take the case above the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum

Judge Munley ruled that the case would remain in federal court, after removal from state court. The insured allegedly suffered severe personal injuries, and the carrier refused to pay the $25,000 UIM policy limits. The state court complaint sought damages in excess of $50,000, punitive damages, interest, counsel fees and costs.

The court recognized that actual damages were limited to $25,000, and the punitive damage and attorney’s fees claims would have to exceed $50,000 to meet the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum. Judge Munley found that “[a] punitive damages award which is double the amount of the policy limit is reasonable and possible in such a case.” As remand is only proper when it appears to “a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover, or was never entitled to recover, the jurisdictional amount [$75,000],” he denied the motion to remand.

The insured pleads a plausible bad faith claim where delays and refusal to pay the sum demanded are not mere disagreements over valuation

Judge Munley observed the insured alleged a severe injury, with damages beyond the tortfeasor’s coverage limits. The insured’s UIM coverage was $25,000, which the defendant carrier refused to pay. Judge Munley concluded the case, as pleaded, was not merely a disagreement over claim valuation, but made out a plausible bad faith claim.

The following averments were sufficient to survive the insurer’s motion to dismiss:

  1. “The amended complaint avers that defendant failed to effectuate a prompt fair and equitable settlement of plaintiff’s claim and compelled her to seek legal redress and commence litigation to recover the benefits to which she was entitled.”

  2. “Further, defendant ignored and discounted the severity of plaintiff’s injuries.”

  3. “Also, defendant did not promptly evaluate the claim, but rather engaged in dilatory and abusive claims handling by delaying the valuation of plaintiff’s claim and failing to pay the claim.”

  4. “The amended complaint also suggests that defendant failed to timely investigate or to make a reasonable settlement offer.”

  5. “Defendant further delayed by asking for authorization to receive medical records which were already in its possession.”

The court also refused to dismiss an attorney’s fee demand under the breach of contract count, as such fees might prove permissible under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act (MVFRL).

Dates of Decision: July 1, 2019

Pivtchev v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania No. 3:19cv150, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109378 (M.D. Pa. July 1, 2019) (Munley, J.)

Pivtchev v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania No. 3:19cv150, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109377 (M.D. Pa. July 1, 2019) (Munley, J.)


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These two recent Middle District of Pennsylvania cases provide guidance at either end of the spectrum on pleading statutory bad faith.


This case involved a coverage dispute and bad faith claims. The insured municipality sought repayment for a $1,000,000 settlement over a death arising out of an automobile accident involving one of the city’s police officers. The underlying suit included federal constitutional claims.

There were two $1,000,000 policies at issue: an auto policy and a law enforcement policy. The insurer paid $500,000 under the auto policy, but refused payment under the law enforcement policy per an auto exclusion.

The court agreed the law enforcement policy did not provide coverage. However, it rejected an argument that the auto policy payment was limited under a state statute capping tort liability at $500,000. The court found that the cap did not apply to federal civil rights claims. Thus, coverage for the remaining $500,000 was potentially due.

The court, however, dismissed the bad faith claim without prejudice, stating:

Defendants argue that the City’s insurance bad faith claim must fail because, although the City alleged that [the insurers] lacked a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policies, the City did not allege that [the insurers] “knew or recklessly disregarded [the] lack of reasonable basis [when] denying the … claim[s],” as required by law. This Court agrees with [the insurers], and will dismiss the City’s insurance bad faith claim. That dismissal, however, will be without prejudice, and the City may amend its complaint to satisfy the identified deficiency.

Date of Decision: May 16, 2019

City of Williamsport v. CNA Insurance. Cos., U. S. District Court Middle of Pennsylvania No. 4:19-CV-00170, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82667 (M.D. Pa. May 16, 2019) (Brann, J.)


This case provides an example of an insured sufficiently amending a defectively pleaded first complaint, to survive a motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

The original complaint was dismissed without prejudice for conclusory pleading, even though it included 29 bad faith averments. The summary of the court’s first dismissal can be found here.

In addressing a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the court restated principles from its prior decision. Unlike the first complaint, however, the court found the following allegations went beyond conclusory pleading:

In the complaint presently before the Court, [the insured’s] bad faith count, Count II, lists 20 allegations of bad faith. … The Court finds that each of these subparagraphs describe who, what, where, when, and how the bad faith alleged in each subpart of ¶73 occurred. … Further, the Court finds that the amended complaint adequately alleges that [the insurer] acted in bad faith, and sufficiently articulates the factual basis of the bad faith claim. Each subparagraph details the factual basis for the bad faith claim. These averments are sufficient to allow this claim to go forward, and the complaint satisfactorily pleads both elements of a bad faith claim, that the insurer did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy, and that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of reasonable basis in denying the insured’s claim.

Date of Decision: May 23, 2019

Sowinski v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-02352, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87140 (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2019) (Mehalchick, M.J.)


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As we have discussed on this Blog for many years, case law is divided on whether statutory bad faith can exist if no coverage is due. We addressed this in some detail within this October 2018 post, summarizing a federal case where the court stated that Pennsylvania law allows for statutory bad faith even in the absence of any coverage obligation. In that October 2018 post, we additionally noted the presence of case law that would allow a bad faith claim to proceed where coverage is not due for procedural reasons, e.g., an otherwise covered claim is barred by a contractual limitations period. By contrast, this even more recent post summarizes an opinion, from the same federal court, finding there can be no bad faith if no coverage is due.

Linked here is a detailed article addressing whether Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute only addresses bad faith coverage denials and refusals to defend, and does not provide relief for poor claims handling or the like when these underlying benefits are not due. Under this view, poor claims handling or communications failures are evidence of statutory bad faith in denying benefits, but such conduct is not actionable (cognizable) statutory bad faith in itself.


In the present case, arising out of the very same federal court as the aforementioned cases, the insured’s breach of contract claim was dismissed as time-barred by the policy’s suit limitation clause. The court, however, permitted the bad faith action to proceed. Specifically, the court stated: “Because Plaintiff asserts bad faith as to conduct beyond [the carrier’s] denial of coverage, the Court must consider the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s bad faith claim even though Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is time-barred.”

The court quoted from footnote 3 of the 2017 Dagit case: “It is well established that a claim for bad faith brought against an insurer pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 8371 is a separate and distinct cause of action and is not contingent on the resolution of the underlying contract claim. Thus, if bad faith is asserted as to conduct beyond a denial of coverage, the bad faith claim is actionable as to that conduct regardless of whether the contract claim survives.”

[Note: Dagit relies on cases such as Doylestown Electric Supply Co. v. Maryland Casualty Insurance Co., 942 F. Supp. 1018 (E.D. Pa. 1996), March v. Paradise Mutual Insurance Co., 646 A.2d 1254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), and the Third Circuit’s unpublished opinion in Gallatin Fuels, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 244 F. App’x 424 (3d Cir. 2007). As in the present case, Doylestown Electrical and March involved contractual suit limitations provisions barring coverage, and not lack of coverage under substantive policy provisions. Gallatin Fuels addressed the extraordinary situation where the policy was not in effect at the relevant time, but the court held the bad faith statute still applied because the insurer believed it had a policy in effect and acted poorly while holding that belief. These cases are addressed in the article linked here and above.]


After finding the bad faith claim could proceed, the court still had to address the complaint’s adequacy. It found the bad faith claim adequately pleaded, stating:

[The insurer] argues that [the insured] does not provide any facts to support his allegation that [the insurer] acted in bad faith by denying him coverage under the insurance policy for the damage sustained to his home by the snowstorm. … To the contrary, [the insured] sets forth a myriad of facts to support his claim. For example, [the insured] alleges he was given contradictory information by [the insurer’s] agents as to the coverage of his policy and how he could collect under his policy and subsequently appeal [the insurer’s] denial of that coverage, which he relied upon to his detriment. … [The insured] also alleges that he was instructed to file multiple claims, which caused him to pay multiple deductibles and which ultimately discredited his claim. … In holding [the insured’s] Second Amended Complaint to a “less stringent standard,” as required of the Court in light of [his] pro se representation, the Court finds that [the insured] sufficiently alleged a claim for bad faith and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied as to this claim.

Date of Decision: May 10, 2019

Nguyen v. Allstate Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-5019, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79822 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2019) (Kenney, J.)


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Offering a different take on the usual challenge to federal pleadings, the insurer moved to strike portions of this UIM bad faith complaint as immaterial and impertinent, rather than to dismiss the entire complaint.

The complaint pleaded the insurer’s alleged refusal to pay full medical benefits, and the alleged consequences of that refusal vis-à-vis the insured and third parties. The insurer focused its motion on striking four specific paragraphs of the complaint.

The first two paragraphs raised the insurer’s advertisements directed to members of the military. The insured, a long serving Army veteran, alleged that he relied on representations and warranties made in these advertisements, which the insurer breached. The court agreed to strike these two paragraphs as irrelevant to the issue of whether the insurer breached a duty under the policy itself, or violated the bad faith statute. In addition, the court found these warranty averments prejudicial, as they could lead a jury to believe the insurer owed duties outside the policy.

The court, however, refused to strike the other two paragraphs at issue.

One of these paragraphs included an averment that the insurer refused to pay a benefit due, while also mentioning grievances directed at third parties. The alleged refusal to pay the insured was enough to preserve this paragraph, even though the allegations regarding third parties may not be actionable.

As to the final paragraph at issue, the insurer took the position that the injuries at issue did not arise from the accident. The insured argued the ramifications of this erroneous position posed a variety of detriments to him, with simultaneous advantages to the insurer. While the paragraph did have some focus on contingent future conduct, it still alleged the insurer had already refused to pay for medical treatment, and how this refusal might be used by the insurer to its advantage in limiting payments or evidence. The court held: “These averments could bear some possible relation to whether Defendant … breached a duty owed under the Policy or imposed by Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute. See Rancosky v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Co., 642 Pa. 153, 170 A.3d 364, 365 (Pa. 2017) (finding that evidence of an insurance company’s motive of self-interest or ill-will may be probative of a bad faith claim).”

Date of Decision: May 6, 2018

Bacon v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co., U. S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania No. 1:18-cv-01686, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76218, 2019 WL 1988214 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2019) (Kane, J.)


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As we posted earlier today, the theme is plaintiffs adequately pleading bad faith claims in federal court.

In this second post, the insured set out plausible bad faith claims in this property damage case by making specific factual allegations. The key assertions were that the insurer improperly “hired, retained and relied upon the opinion of an engineer or other professional knowing that such opinion would be favorable to [the insurer] on a financial incentive basis; and (2) disregarded information provided to it from the Plaintiffs that [the insurer’s] inspection and engineering report was inadequate, flawed, and erroneous.”

The court found the “complaint, taken as a whole, goes beyond a mere boilerplate recital of the elements of the statute. Rather, as we construe the complaint, it provides a chronology detailing alleged failures … to evaluate this claim in good faith. Instead, according to the plaintiffs [the insurer] relied upon false justifications to deny their claim; under-valuated their property; failed to account for the loss of use of the property; and demonstrated bad faith in its investigation of this insurance claim in 14 different ways, including specific allegations that [the insurer]: (1) hired, retained and relied upon the opinion of an engineer or other professional knowing that such opinion would be favorable to Allstate on a financial incentive basis; and (2) disregarded information provided to it from the Plaintiffs that Allstate’s inspection and engineering report was inadequate, flawed, and erroneous.”

The issue of the expert’s alleged financial bias could not be resolved in a judgment on the pleadings. “Thus, the plaintiffs’ complaint raises questions of motivation and bias which cannot be resolved on the pleadings alone. Therefore, the task of determining whether this expert report provides a defense as a matter of law to the bad faith claim in this case, in our view, may not be performed on consideration of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, where we must simply assess the adequacy of the pleadings. Instead, assessment of any such defense must await a properly documented motion for summary judgment.”

Date of Decisions: January 8, 2019 (Report and Recommendation), adopted by District Court on April 25, 2019

Flower v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co., U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania Civil No. 3:18-CV-1321, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4096 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2019) (Carlson, M.J.) (Report and Recommendation), adopted by District Judge Mariani on April 25, 2019


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The common theme in today’s two posts is the plaintiffs’ adequately pleading bad faith in federal court.

In this first post, the carrier moved to dismiss the uninsured motorist bad faith claim. The insured alleged bad faith for the carrier’s failing to negotiate or offer adequate compensation for damage claims submitted, with an apparent policy limits ($300,000) demand in place.

The court found the complaint adequately pleaded a bad faith claim, focusing on delays in the claims handling process. Significantly, some of the facts the court relied upon were framed expressly as violations of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA). [Note: Compare this decision to the Eastern District Horn case, decided three weeks later, where the court stated “that, since the current bad faith standard was established in Terletsky ‘courts in the [Third] circuit have … refused to consider UIPA violations as evidence of bad faith.'” The Terletsky standards have since been adopted by Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court in Rancosky.]

The following facts were considered sufficient to support a plausible claim: “Defendant unduly delayed the investigative insurance process, which is aptly illustrated by his allegations that: Defendant became aware of Plaintiff’s claim ‘nearly immediately’ after the accident; Defendant failed to conduct a Statement Under Oath until January 5, 2018—nearly 18 months after the accident; Defendant did not perform an Independent Medical Evaluation for the case until May 9, 2018—nearly 23 months after the accident; and, Defendant did not make a first claim offer until two years and nine months after the accident.”

“With that said, the statutory violation would not be found in the delay per se, but rather in Defendant’s alleged failure to send any periodic, statutorily mandated communications, in writing, explaining such delay, and informing Plaintiff of when a decision on the claim might be expected, in violation of 31 Pa. Code § 146.6. Beyond the alleged delay in the investigation of the disputed claim, Plaintiff further pleads Defendant’s complete failure to provide the required written notices in connection with Defendant’s acceptance (or denial) of the disputed insurance claim until 17 months after the accident, in violation of 31 Pa. Code § 146.7(c)(1).” [Note: The court’s footnotes citing these two codes sections are quoted at length below]

“The consistent lack of timely notices, if ultimately proven true, would be relevant in determining the nature of Defendant’s dealings with Plaintiff, particularly so when considering Plaintiff’s averment that he did not receive a settlement offer until two years and nine days after the claimed accident, and for $285,000.00 below [the $300,000.00] policy limits.”

“This Court further notes that a plaintiff seeking damages for an insurer’s bad faith conduct under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371 may attempt to prove bad faith by demonstrating that the insurer has violated one or more provisions of related Pennsylvania insurance statutes or regulations, even if they do not independently provide for private causes of action. See Berg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 PA Super 88, 44 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. Super. 2012).”

“This Court finds that the extended duration, coupled with the alleged statutory violations, speak to a plausible ‘reckless disregard’ by Defendant as to its duties relating to good faith and fair dealing.”

Date of Decision: April 3, 2019

Blease v. Geico Casualty Co., U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-3893, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57145 (E.D. Pa. April 3, 2019) (Jones, II, J.)

Footnote 5 states: Section 146.6 sets forth appropriate standards for prompt investigations of insurance claims, providing that “[e]very insurer shall complete investigation of a claim within 30 days after notification of claim, unless the investigation cannot reasonably be completed within the time. If the investigation cannot be completed within 30 days, and every 45 days thereafter, the insurer shall provide the claimant with a reasonable written explanation for the delay and state when a decision on the claim may be expected.” 31 Pa. Code § 146.6.

Footnote 6 states: 31 Pa. Code § 146.7(c)(1) sets forth standards for prompt, fair, and equitable settlements applicable to insurers: “If the insurer needs more time to determine whether a first-party claim should be accepted or denied, it shall so notify the first-party claimant within 15 working days after receipt of the proofs of loss giving the reasons more time is needed. If the investigation remains incomplete, the insurer shall, 30 days from the date of the initial notification and every 45 days thereafter, send to the claimant a letter setting forth the reasons additional time is needed for investigation and state when a decision on the claim may be expected.” 31 Pa. Code § 146.7(c)(1).