In Luff v. Allstate Insurance Company, Plaintiff passenger filed an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim against Defendant insurer.  The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas entered a judgment of non pros.  The Court determined that Plaintiff had no substantive claims to appeal as she failed to file a Pa.R.C.P. 3051 petition for relief from judgment of non pros.  In addition, Plaintiff failed to proceed with due diligence by, among other things, creating delays in the claim and the case by failing to provide medical records and then bringing suit against the parties involved.  Further, Plaintiff appealed a court order directing payment of the first arbitrator’s fee and refused to pay the second arbitrator’s request for advance partial payment.  The Court found that Plaintiff’s reasons for delay were not compelling as she was responsible for moving her case forward, not to mention Defendants were prejudiced as the case was inactive for over four years and the underlying accident had occurred 14 years earlier.

Date of Decision:  October 27, 2006

Luff v. Allstate Ins. Co., Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, May Term 2001, No. 02561, 2006 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 422 (Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. October 27, 2006) (Moss, J.)

 

In Cronin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Plaintiff alleged that he was injured in a motor vehicle accident and Defendant refused to pay medical and wage loss benefits in bad faith.  Defendant argued that Pennsylvania’s Bad Faith Statute was preempted by the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), which provides that an insured seeking first party medical benefits may be entitled to benefits plus interest, as well as costs and attorneys’ fees, if the court finds that treatment was medically necessary.  The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania looked to federal case law, which has held that the MVFRL provides the exclusive first party remedy for bad faith denials by insurance companies with respect to claims arising out of automobile accidents.  Thus, the Court held that the MVFRL preempted Pennsylvania’s Bad Faith statute and dismissed Plaintiff’s claim.

Date of Decision:  October 30, 2006

Cronin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, No. 3:06-CV-1081, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82139 (M.D. Pa. October 30, 2006) (Caputo, J.)

 

In Javorski v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania considered Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify Attorney Selingo and his law firm based on assertions that continued representation would violate various rules of professional conduct addressing conflict of interest and attorneys as witnesses.  Selingo was Plaintiff’s counsel in Plaintiff’s underlying Under Insured Motorist (UIM) and bad faith claims.  Selingo was also an employee of Nationwide’s Trial Division from 1996 to 2001, when he primarily represented Nationwide’s insureds in UIM claims, but never in bad faith claims.  Following his employment with Nationwide, Selingo went into private practice as a lawyer and handled several claims against Nationwide, pursuing multiple bad faith and UIM actions, none of which led to Nationwide moving for his disqualification. 

First, Defendant argued Selingo should be disqualified based on Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9, which hinges on whether the matter is “substantially related” to the matter involved in the former legal representation.  Specifically if the lawyer might have acquired confidential information related to the subject matter of his subsequent representation, then Rule 1.9 would prevent the attorney from representing the second client.  Because Selingo never represented Defendant as a lawyer in any bad faith claims, and because Defendant waived disqualification by not previously seeking Selinger’s disqualification as counsel in other similar cases, the Court denied Defendant’s request to disqualify based on Rule 1.9. 

Defendant then argued that Selingo should be disqualified based on Local Rule 43.1 of the Local Rules of the Middle District of Pennsylvania and Rule 3.7 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, which require withdrawal if an attorney becomes a witness on behalf of a client.  However, the Court narrowly construed the rules to only apply to trials and found that disqualification of the lawyer would be premature at this stage in the litigation.  Finally, Defendant argued that Selingo’s law firm should be disqualified pursuant to Rule 1.10 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct which addresses the imputation of conflicts of interest.  The Court also rejected this argument, as Rule 1.10 relates to conflicts of interest defined in Rule 1.7 and 1.9, and because the Court concluded that Rule 1.9 does not form a basis for disqualification (and Rule 1.7 is not at issue), Rule 1.10 is not applicable.  Accordingly, the Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Disqualify.

Date of Decision:  November 6, 2006.

Javorski v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, No. 3:06-CV-1071, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81490 (M.D. Pa. November 6, 2006) (Conaboy, J.)