Archive for the 'NJ – Sworn Statement/EUO' Category
The insureds were attorneys sued by an insurance carrier. The insured attorneys sought coverage from their own professional liability carrier, and the malpractice carrier asserted no coverage was due. The attorneys/insureds and the professional liability carrier each sought a declaration in their favor on coverage.
The insureds won an early summary judgment ruling form a magistrate judge that the professional liability carrier had a duty to defend. The magistrate judge denied the professional liability carrier reconsideration and permission to take an interlocutory appeal. She did not rule on any indemnification responsibility, as the underlying suit against the attorneys remained pending.
The professional liability insurer still wanted to take an examination under oath, and the insured responded by seeking a protective order. Initially, the magistrate judge administratively terminated the case, pending the outcome of the underlying action.
Issues arose concerning the insured’s cooperation in connection with defending the underlying suit. The magistrate judge reopened the case, ruling that an examination under oath should go forward, that the insureds had a duty to cooperate under the professional liability policy, and that the insureds were not entitled to defense costs during periods of non-cooperation.
The present decision involves an appeal to the District Court from the magistrate judge’s order.
The magistrate judge found the insureds had failed to cooperate by delaying the examination under oath, failed to respond to the professional liability carrier’s offer of defense, and failed to respond to a request for information. She held that although the insureds did not act in bad faith, their actions did appreciably prejudice the malpractice carrier.
On appeal, the District Court agreed that there had been a failure to cooperate, but this failure was not the result of bad faith. The District Court reversed, however, on the issue of appreciable prejudice, finding none. Most important, the insurer had not “irretrievably lost the opportunity to take [an examination under oath]….” Nor was the carrier “precluded from discovering facts that may weigh against coverage under the Policy.”
The District Court agreed with the magistrate judge that there was no appreciable prejudice due to the insured’s refusal to respond concerning the carrier’s providing a defense, stating: “Irrespective of whether Plaintiffs accepted or rejected the defense offer before the [underlying] suit settlement, the only issue remaining post settlement pertains to indemnification. … Thus, there can be no appreciable prejudice … for its inability to defend the [underlying] suit before it settled. Any dispute regarding Plaintiffs’ alleged failure to provide information, including defense costs, may be addressed when the indemnification issue is decided. Accordingly, because [the professional liability carrier] failed to demonstrate appreciable prejudice, it cannot disclaim coverage for Plaintiffs’ noncooperation under the Policy.”
The District Court affirmed the magistrate’s ruling that there was no defect in the malpractice carrier’s reservation of rights.
Likewise, the District Court upheld the magistrate’s decision that the carrier was entitled to the examination under oath, and finding a failure to cooperate. First, the right to take the examination had not been waived. Nor was the request for the examination unreasonable or unfair: “For the reasons already stated, [the] ROR was proper after this Court determined that [the underlying] suit triggered a duty to defend and reserved on the issue of indemnification. It would defy logic to find that [the professional liability carrier] has a duty to defend and properly reserved its rights as to liability yet preclude an EUO to investigate the underlying claims pursuant to the Policy.”
Finally, simply settling the case did not end the insured’s obligations to cooperate under the policy, which expressly provided the insurer with the right to take an examination under oath.
Date of Decision: September 23, 2020
Karzadi, v. Evanston Insurance Company, U.S. District Court District of New Jersey No. 17-5470 SDWCLW, 2020 WL 5652442 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2020) (Wigenton, J.)
The insurer sought damages and rescission under Pennsylvania common law and New Jersey’s Insurance Fraud Prevention Act. There was a fire at the insured’s New Jersey shore home, and allegedly subsequent theft of personal property from the home. The insured made a claim for lost personal property and submitted photographs of the lost items.
After investigation, the insurer concluded that the photographs were taken after the fire loss at issue, at a different home owned by the insured in Philadelphia. Thus, contrary to the insured’s sworn statement, these items were not lost or stolen from her shore home.
The policy provided there was no coverage “if, whether before or after a loss, an ‘insured’ has: 1. intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance; 2. engaged in fraudulent conduct; or 3. made false statements relating to this insurance.”
The insurer denied the claims for the personal property in the photos on the basis that the insured “intentionally concealed and/or misrepresented material facts concerning [her] claim for personal property, and made false statements regarding the items that were allegedly lost due to the fire or theft.”
The insured brought breach of contract and bad faith claims, which were dismissed for lack of prosecution. The insurer’s fraud claims were raised as counterclaims. The insured did not file any opposition, and by the time the insurer moved for summary judgment, the insured was pro se.
On the Pennsylvania common law fraud claims, the court observed: “It follows, as the night follows the day, that [the insured] has suffered no personal property loss for the items photographed since she still had possession of those undamaged items after the fire and alleged theft.”
The court not only granted relief on the personal property damage claims for the allegedly lost items, but as to the entire loss, including the sum paid for the value of the home. The court stated:
“The record is clear that [the insurer] made payments … in reliance on what it believed at the time to be her truthful representations about her losses as a result of the fire and alleged theft. [The insurer paid] $351,767.17 in dwelling coverage and $10,000 in personal property coverage. As it turned out, there is no genuine dispute about the fact that [the insured] made materially false representations … in an effort to mislead it into paying her for personal property which she did not lose. … Under the terms of the insurance policy, no coverage is provided if the insured either before or after the loss intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact, engaged in fraudulent conduct, or made a false statement relating to their insurance. Clearly, [the insured] breached these provisions of the policy.”
Accordingly, we will enter summary judgment … against [the insured] on the counterclaim of common law fraud for $361,767.16, the amount …paid to her.”
The court also granted equitable rescission under Pennsylvania common law fraud principles, and granted relief under New Jersey’s Insurance Fraud Prevention Act. The court noted that the New Jersey statute includes recovery of reasonable investigation expenses, costs of suit and attorney’s fees. However, the court did not appear to award damages for investigation, costs or legal fees.
The Act itself provides for relief against an insured who “(1) Presents or causes to be presented any written or oral statement as part of, or in support of or opposition to, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy . . . knowing that the statement contains any false or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to the claim; or . . . (3) Conceals or knowingly fails to disclose the occurrence of an event which affects any person’s initial or continued right or entitlement to (a) any insurance benefit or payment or (b) the amount of any benefit or payment to which the person is entitled[.] N.J.S.A. § 17:33A-4(a).(1, 3).”
The same facts supporting the common law fraud finding supported this statutory relief.
Finally, the court also awarded over $45,000 in prejudgment interest on the Pennsylvania claims.
Date of Decision: August 21, 2018
Pallante v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, U. S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-1142, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141427 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2018) (Bartle, J.)
This is a bad faith case arising out of Superstorm Sandy damage to the insured’s home. Coverage for the full loss was denied, and breach of contract and bad faith claims followed. This opinion involves the insurer’s summary judgment motion on the bad faith claim. Judgment was entered on the bad faith claim for the insurer.
Bad Faith Standards
New Jersey recognizes bad faith claims for “both bad faith in denial of benefits and bad faith in delay of processing of claims.” A bad faith claim might exist where payment was intentionally and unreasonably delayed on an undisputed claim. The test is whether a claim is “fairly debatable”. If the insured cannot establish “as a matter of law a right to summary judgment on the substantive claim [e.g., the breach of the insurance contract]” there is no actionable bad faith claim. The plaintiff has to show the “absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and the defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable basis for denying the claim.”
In the first party context, under New Jersey law: “Although a fairly debatable claim is a necessary condition to avoid liability for bad faith, it is not always a sufficient condition. Rather, we are satisfied that the appropriate inquiry is whether there is sufficient evidence from which reasonable minds could conclude that in the investigation, evaluation, and processing of the claim, the insurer acted unreasonably and either knew or was conscious of the fact that its conduct was unreasonable.” In this case, the “principal issue presented is whether Plaintiff has adduced factual evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that [the insurer] lacked a fairly debatable reason for denying the disputed portion of the claim. Because in this summary judgment motion [the insurer] has set forth the factual basis for its determinations of coverage and loss, and because Plaintiff has not come forward with evidence that Plaintiff’s entitlement to recover for these losses was so clear that it was not fairly debatable, Plaintiff will be unable to prove its bad faith claim in Count 2 and summary judgment will be granted….”
No bad faith conduct on the record in claims handling
Specifically, the court observed that the insured did not seek summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, and the court itself was not going to find it undisputed that the contract was breached. This alone would appear to be fatal to the insured’s opposition under the reasonably debatable standard. Further, the court observed that the insurer considered the opinions and advice of expert consultants in the claims handling process. The court also listed a variety of “plausible” steps the insurer took to adjust the claim.
No bad faith delay
The court further rejected the insured’s delay argument. It found the insurer promptly investigated the damages, retained experts and a licensed contractor to evaluate the claims, and shared its findings with the insured throughout the process. The insured failed to submit responsible estimates during the process with supporting documentation, and was unresponsive for many months at a time, included a delay in submitting a sworn statement in proof of loss.
Rhetorical assertions without support unsuccessful
The court addressed “Plaintiff’s rhetorical assertions that bad faith is demonstrable from assigning incompetent and inattentive claims adjusters who were ‘repeatedly told … to sit back and wait for the statute of limitations to run out in the hopes that the Plaintiff would miss the filing deadline’….” There was no support for this assertion and, to the contrary, the insured’s large loss director instructed the claim adjuster “to remind Plaintiff’s representatives in writing that the policy contained a two-year suit limitation condition” and the adjuster did so by writing a letter calling “attention to the suit limitation in advance of the approaching deadline.”
Alleged incompetent adjusting did not affect this claim
Early in the claims handling process an adjuster was criticized by his superior for not documenting the file. That adjuster was replaced. However, that this adjuster “temporarily failed to address the potential claim does not give rise to a material factual dispute, as it is undisputed that proper investigation was undertaken, results were shared and explained to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s agent, and the claim file was put squarely on track as directed by the management. That there remains an area of disputed claims, as alleged in Count One, does not imply that those disputes were caused by [the insurer’s] deliberate indifference to a proper investigation and claims adjustment process.”
Attorney’s fees not recoverable
Date of Decision: March 29, 2018
Breitman v. National Surety Corp., Civil Action No. 14-7843 (JBS/AMD), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52496 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2018) (Simandle, J.)
