Archive for the 'PA – Claims Handling (general)' Category

DURATION OF INVESTIGATION ALONE CANNOT ESTABLISH BAD FAITH; BAD FAITH CLAIM POSSIBLE EVEN WHERE COVERAGE IS EXCLUDED UNDER THE POLICY (Western District)

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

The carrier denied the insured homeowners’ property damage claim.  They sued for breach of contract and bad faith, and the carrier moved to dismiss.

First, the court found the insureds failed to plead their losses were covered under the policy at issue, and dismissed the breach of contract claim because no coverage was due under the policy.

Moving to the bad faith claim, Western District Judge Hardy found there are two general kinds of statutory bad faith in Pennsylvania:  (i) coverage denial bad faith and (ii) poor claim handling bad faith beyond coverage denial.  The court states:  “However, if bad faith is asserted as to conduct beyond a denial of coverage, the bad faith claim is actionable as to that conduct regardless of whether the contract claim survives.”

[As stated on this Blog again and again over the years, this second point is questionable.  The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Toy v. Metropolitan Life indicates that cognizable statutory bad faith claims require denial of a benefit, i.e., denial of coverage in a first party claim or refusal to defend and cover in a third party claim are the sine qua non for section 8371 clams. Under this theory, complaints about poor claim handling practices, where no coverage is due or benefit denied, go to the insurance commissioner.  Examples of such Blog posts can be found on January 28, 2020, March 25, 2020, July 16, 2020, August 10, 2020, August 27, 2020, September 24, 2020, January 19, 2021, March 25, 2021,   and this article detailing our reasoning.]

The court readily found no bad faith claim based on a benefit denial, since the court ruled that no coverage was due under the policy.  The bad faith analysis does not stop there, per the position that poor conduct, even where no benefit is or can be due, might constitute section 8371 bad faith.

Even under that standard, however, these plaintiffs’ claim failed for failing to plead a plausible claim. Thus, the court states, “to the extent that Plaintiffs’ bad faith claim is based on [the  insurer’s] alleged failure to conduct an adequate investigation, Plaintiffs simply do not assert sufficient factual allegations in their Amended Complaint to support such a cognizable bad faith claim.”

The court recites the plaintiffs’ conclusory bad faith pleading, that simply recite elements of the cause of action, rather than facts, as examples of inadequate pleading.  The factual allegation that the insurer’s inspection lasted only ten minutes, and did not include testing or measurement taking, still did not cut the mustard. “Although the duration of an adjuster’s inspection might be relevant to a claim of bad faith, it does not itself demonstrate bad faith.”  Judge Hardy relied upon Western District Judge Wiegand’s 2020 Palek decision, summarized here, and Eastern District Judge McLaughlin’s 2012 Gold decision, summarized here, for the principle that the duration of an investigation or review, by itself, cannot establish a plausible bad faith claim.

Judge Hardy also observed, “since Plaintiffs allege that the damage at issue was visible to the naked eye from the interior of the basement and was not obstructed or concealed from view,” it is not clear that [the] visual inspection of the wall was unreasonable under the circumstances that Plaintiffs describe.”

In sum, “even accepting the cited allegations as true, Plaintiffs have not pled sufficient facts in their Amended Complaint to support a cognizable claim of bad faith for … failure to conduct an adequate investigation.”

Date of Decision:  September 30, 2021

Levine v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania No. CV 20-1108, 2021 WL 4480168 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021) (Hardy, J.)

TWO BAD FAITH OPINIONS BY PHILADELPHIA FEDERAL JUDGE DARNELL JONES: (1) BARE BONES UIM BAD FAITH CLAIM DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (2) NO DUTY TO DEFEND = NO BAD FAITH (Philadelphia Federal)

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

Eastern District Judge Darnell Jones recently rendered two bad faith decisions just a few days apart.

CASE 1  – Underinsured Motorist Bad Faith Claim Dismissed Without Prejudice

In the first case, Judge Jones dismissed an underinsured motorist bad faith claim, with leave to amend.

The court focused on the recent Western District decision in Faith, summarized here, to emphasize bad faith can “include a lack of investigation, unnecessary or unfounded investigation, failure to communicate with the insured, or failure to promptly acknowledge or act on claims. Bad faith can also include poor claims-handling, the insurer’s failure to act with diligence or respond to the insured, scattershot investigation, and similar conduct.”

That being said, a UIM bad faith plaintiff “’cannot merely say that an insurer acted unfairly, but instead must describe with specificity what was unfair.’”  Judge Jones relies upon Philadelphia Federal Judge Baylson’s recent O’Brien decision, summarized here, which in turn relied upon Western District Judge Colville’s 2020 Pierchalski decision, summarized here, for this proposition.

Rather, “a Complaint alleging bad faith ‘must specifically include facts to address who, what, where, when, and how the alleged bad faith conduct occurred.’” Bare bones bad faith pleadings in Pennsylvania’s District Courts are routinely dismissed. As examples, Judge Jones cites Eastern District Judge Leeson’s 2020 Shetayh v. State Farm opinion, summarized here, the oft-cited 2012 Third Circuit opinion in Smith v. State Farm, summarized here, Eastern District Magistrate Judge Heffley’s decision in Camp v. NJM, summarized here, Eastern District Judge Slomsky’s 2017 decision in Toner v. GEICO, summarized here, and the Western District decision in Rosenberg v. Amica Mutual, summarized here.

The Complaint fell into the inadequate pleading column, as it was “devoid of facts necessary to infer a plausible bad faith claim.” Other than the accident date, the complaint has no “references to dates or time spans, yet claims several of Defendant’s alleged actions to be untimely.” Plaintiffs allege unreasonableness as to the insurer’s alleged lack of thorough claim assessment, “yet provide[s] no indication as to the manner in which these alleged deficiencies were unreasonable.”

The court cites Judge Baylson’s 2015 Allen v. State Farm case, summarized here, for the proposition that simply reciting that the insurer failed to properly investigate and evaluate a claim, and knew or recklessly disregarded its unreasonable conduct, are conclusory in nature, because all this language does is recite the elements of a bad faith claim, without pleading basic facts to support those elements.

Here, there are no facts pleaded from which the court could draw reasonable inferences supporting a plausible bad faith claim.  The “complaint alleges no factual content to suggest Defendant lacked a reasonable basis for denying the UIM coverage, or that Defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the lack of reasonable basis.”

Dismissal was without prejudice, however, because after the court’s “careful assessment of the allegations set forth in [the bad faith count] of Plaintiffs’ Complaint (as well as those incorporated by reference), this Court is unable to conclude that amendment would be futile.”

Date of Decision:  September 27, 2021

Kelly v. Progressive Advanced Insurance Company, U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania No. CV 20-5661, 2021 WL 4399657 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2021) (Jones, II, J.)

CASE 2 – Bad Faith Not Possible Where No Duty to Defend

In the second case, Judge Jones found no duty to defend the insured, as the claims pleaded against the insured clearly fell within a policy exclusion. Once Judge Jones found coverage obligations absent, he stated the following in a footnote, addressing the bad faith claim:

“[B]ad faith claims cannot survive a determination that there was no duty to defend, because the court’s determination that there was no potential coverage means that the insurer had good cause to refuse to defend.” (internal quotations omitted)

Date of Decision:  October 1, 2021

Jeffers Farms, Inc. v. Liberty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania No. CV 20-5475, 2021 WL 4502785 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2021) (Jones, J.)

BAD FAITH CLAIM PLAUSIBLY STATED FOR INSURER FORCING A CLAIM INTO LITIGATION WHEN IT ALLEGEDLY KNEW POLICY LIMITS WERE DUE AND REFUSED TO PAY THEM (Western District)

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

Plaintiff successfully stated a bad faith claim in this underinsured motorist case.

Plaintiff alleged serious injuries, lost earnings and earning capacity, and emotional injuries. The UIM policy limit was $50,000.  The insured submitted documented medical claims showing the severity of his injuries, and a life care plan indicating over $388,000 in future medical expenses.  More specifically, the insured “provided documentation and medical records for a period immediately following the accident through October 1, 2020 connecting cervical root compression and bilateral disc protrusion with surgical ablation to the motor vehicle accident on August 11, 2018, and reflecting that [the insured] will require $388,117 in future medical care and related expenses).”

In addition, the insured alleged the carrier “failed (and continues to fail) to investigate and process his claim given information showing the seriousness of his injuries and resulting economic loss stemming from the accident.  Moreover, [the insurer] allegedly is “[f]orcing the plaintiff … to proceed to litigate his claims to recover underinsured motorist benefits.”

The carrier refused to pay the $50,000 limit, and the insured brought claims for breach of contract and bad faith.  Magistrate Judge Kelly found the insured set out a plausible bad faith claim, based on these allegations over the severity of the injuries, the huge gap between the policy limit and the alleged medical damages, and the insurer’s forcing the insured to litigate the UIM claim instead of paying policy limits.

The court recited the usual bad faith standards, including the standards that statutory bad faith can exist in the absence of a benefit denial, solely for a variety of poor claims handling practices.  [As noted for the last 14 years on this Blog, poor claim handling in the absence of any duty to pay or provide a benefit, as opposed to delaying in paying a benefit owed, should very likely not be the basis of a bad faith claim under Toy v. Metropolitan.  One of our many posts on the subject can be found here.]

In addition, and of considerable interest, the court stated that:

As particularly relevant to the allegations here, “bad faith is actionable regardless of whether it occurs before, during or after litigation…. [Moreover], using litigation in a bad faith effort to evade a duty owed under a policy would be actionable under Section 8371.” Hart v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., No. 17-1158, 2017 WL 11485593, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2017) (quoting W.V. Realty, Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co., 334 F.3d 306, 313 (3d Cir. 2003)). The required inquiry is fact specific and “depend[s] on the conduct of the insurer vis à vis the insured.” Condio v. Erie Ins. Exch., 899 A.2d 1136, 1143 (Pa. Super. 2006).

A summary of Hart,  a Report and Recommendation issued by Western District Magistrate Judge Mitchell, can be found here. He has served in the capacity of a Magistrate Judge since 1972.  The 2017 Hart case was dismissed before the R&R was adopted, but as any seasoned Pennsylvania practitioner knows that even Magistrate Judge Mitchell’s Reports and Recommendations will be treated seriously.

Date of Decision:  September 8, 2021

Faith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania No. 21-CV-0013, 2021 WL 4078658 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2021) (Kelly, M.J.)

BAD FAITH CLAIM PREMATURE IN LIGHT OF ONGOING APPRAISAL PROCESS; UTPCPL DOES NOT APPLY TO CLAIM HANDLING (Philadelphia Federal)

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

This case involves a first party fire loss to the insured’s home.  The insured’s public adjuster estimated damages at over $300,000. The insurer’s adjuster issued a number of reports that consecutively lowered the damage estimate. The final report was less than a ¼ of the plaintiff’s estimate. These differences resulted in the carrier invoking the appraisal process, which was pending at the time this suit was filed.

The insured sued the insurer for breach of contract, bad faith, fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud and violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL).  The last three claims also were made against the carrier’s independent adjuster.

The court dismissed the breach of contract claim because the matter was subject to the ongoing appraisal process.  Judge Padova observed that while there is some right of appeal from the completed appraisal process, the scope of appeal is limited.  Dismissal was without prejudice to pursue those limited appellate rights after the appraisal process ended.  Judge Padova rejected the insured’s argument that this was actually a coverage dispute, rather than a valuation dispute.

Next, Judge Padova stayed the bad faith claim as premature. Because the appraisal process was ongoing, the carrier had never actually denied the claim.  Judge Padova did appear to recognize, however, the insured had pleaded a potential bad faith claim. This was based on allegations concerning the insurer’s involvement in the various decreasing loss estimates, which it allegedly knew were incorrect.

The fraud and UTPCPL claims failed to allege justifiable reliance, and were dismissed.

In addition, as to the UTPCPL claims, Judge Padova states:

Moreover, we note that recent Pennsylvania caselaw has stated that “[t]he UTPCPL applies to consumer transactions, which are statutorily defined[, and] the handling of an insurance claim does not meet the statutory definition.” … Under this authority, “[t]he UTPCPL applies to the sale of an insurance policy, it does not apply to the handling of insurance claims,” and the bad faith statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371, “provides the exclusive statutory remedy applicable to claims handling.” … Accordingly, for this reason as well, we conclude that Plaintiff’s UTPCPL claim, which is grounded on deceptive conduct in the handling of her insurance claim, cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Date of Decision:  June 1, 2021

Bussie v. American Security Insurance Company, U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania No. CV 20-3519, 2021 WL 2206282 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 2021) (Padova, J.)

OUR 1800TH POST: (1) RESERVES DISCOVERABLE; (2) COMMUNICATIONS RETAINING COUNSEL NOT DISCOVERABLE; (3) ISO CLAIM HISTORY REPORT DISCOVERABLE; (4) ASSET REPORT ON TORTFEASOR NOT DISCOVERABLE; (5) CLAIM EVALUATION REPORT ONLY HAS LIMITED WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION; (6) INTERNAL NOTES FULLY PROTECTED ON ATTORNEY COMMUNICATIONS, BUT LIMITED WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION; (7) DEPOSITIONS MAY INQUIRE INTO AREAS WITH ONLY LIMITED WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION (Philadelphia Federal)

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

It has been nearly 15 years since our first bad faith blog post, summarizing an opinion by the late Judge Albert Sheppard.  Today’s summary is our 1,800th post

This Eastern District opinion addresses discovery issues in a UIM bad faith case, including document production and issues arising out of plaintiff seeking to depose the insurer’s claim adjuster and corporate designee.  Magistrate Judge Perkin had already addressed numerous discovery issues in this case in an earlier opinion, summarized here, and now addresses the remaining issues after conducting an in camera review of certain documents on the insurer’s privilege log.

Reserves discoverable in bad faith valuation dispute

Magistrate Judge Perkin observed, “District Courts within the Third Circuit are split on the question of whether reserves are discoverable in bad faith cases.”  He relied on Middle District Magistrate Judge Carlson’s Barnard decision, summarized here, holding that in bad faith cases, reserves are discoverable if the bad faith claim is based on a valuation dispute, rather than outright coverage denial.  As the present case involved a valuation dispute, reserves were discoverable.

Magistrate Judge Perkin further rejected the argument that the reserves were protected work product.  Applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he found that the insurer did “not argue that its reserves were prepared in anticipation of litigation or other than in the normal course of business.”

Internal emails regarding receipt of this lawsuit and assignment to legal counsel not discoverable

The insurer “withheld internal emails regarding receipt of the lawsuit and assignment to its legal counsel. Defendant’s privilege log indicates that these documents were withheld on the grounds that the information is ‘work product, mental impression, confidential, and post litigation.’ After in camera review, this Court finds that the documents have been appropriately withheld. These documents, dated after the lawsuit was filed, are protected by both attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine as the communications were made with the purpose of seeking legal advice and discuss litigation strategy.”

ISO claim search report discoverable

“[T]he ISO Claims Search Database is a nationwide database utilized by insurance companies to track claims history and detect fraud. Defendant withheld the report on Plaintiff’s claims history on the basis that it is not relevant.” The court found the information “relevant to Plaintiff’s bad faith claim to the extent that it is a factor Defendant considered in evaluating Plaintiff’s Underinsured Motorist Claim.”

Asset report for consent to settle/waiver of UIM subrogation purposes not discoverable

Defendant withheld the asset search of the tortfeasor in the underlying motor vehicle accident action, on the basis of irrelevance and confidentiality. The court agreed it was irrelevant to the bad faith claim at issue

Insurer’s evaluation report for plaintiff’s UIM claim: no attorney-client privilege protection and limited work product protection

The insurer withheld its evaluation report on the UIM claim based on “work product, mental impression, attorney-client, confidential, and post litigation.” Magistrate Judge Perkin found “these documents consist of not only the final evaluation of Plaintiff’s claim prepared by claims personnel … but also a detailed history of all updates made by claims adjusters to the report beginning on … the date Plaintiff settled with the tortfeasor.”

First, the court found these documents were not subject to the attorney-client privilege. “[T]he privilege bars discovery of confidential communications made between attorneys and clients for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance to the client. …  The privilege does not apply to the ‘disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney.’” “The evaluation report contains no communications between Defendant and its counsel. Rather, the report contains a series of notations regarding the claim by the claims adjuster….”

Next, Magistrate Judge Perkin dove deep into an analysis of the work product doctrine, addressing the difficult question of when the normal duty to investigate a claim turned into a period where the insurer reasonably anticipated litigation.

Thus, to determine the work-product doctrine’s applicability:

  1. A court must “first establish when Defendant reasonably anticipated litigation.”

  2. “The party asserting work product protection must demonstrate that it subjectively anticipated litigation, and that the anticipation was objectively reasonable.”

  3. “While the court must initially focus on the state of mind of the party preparing, or ordering preparation, of the document, that person’s anticipation of litigation must be objectively reasonable for the work product protection to apply.”

  4. “A party’s anticipation of litigation is objectively reasonable if ‘there existed an identifiable specific claim or impending litigation when the materials were prepared.’”

Magistrate Judge Perkin looked for guidance in Judge Sanchez’s 2014 Borgia opinion, summarized here, and Judge Leeson’s 2016 Wagner decision, summarized here.

In the present case, plaintiff’s counsel first demanded policy limits on January 12, 2018, and the insurer engaged counsel to investigate and evaluate the claim on April 19, 2018.  After being retained, the insurer’s counsel conducted a statement under oath, subpoenaed medical records and assisted in obtaining an IME.

“On July 20, 2018, after the Statement Under Oath was completed, Plaintiff’s counsel again made a demand for policy limits, though she made no threat or mention of litigation. Reviewing the e-mails between counsel, it appears that, from July 20, 2018 through February 27, 2019, the communications involved only requests for authorization of medical records and scheduling of the independent medical examination. On August 26, 2019, the independent medical examination occurred. Shortly after, on September 3, 2019, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit.”

Counsel’s communications indicated plaintiff sought full UIM limits but never threatened litigation. Further, “the communications between counsel from July 20, 2018 through February 7, 2019 concerned continued requests for medical records and authorizations to fully assess Plaintiff’s claim.”

Further, this was not a case where insurer’s claim valuation and the policy limit demand were so far apart that a reasonable insurer would believe litigation could arise, until the August 26, 2019 IME. Magistrate Judge Perkin found it was only at the time the IME concluded in August 2019 that it was “likely that Defendant had determined Plaintiff’s demand for payment in the amount of the policy limit exceeded its expected offer for settlement.” Thus, he held the insurer reasonably anticipated litigation no later than the date the IME concluded, and ordered production of unredacted claim handling entries on the evaluation reports prior to that date.

Internal file notes reflecting communications with counsel protected, but those based on work product are only partially protected

The insurer redacted all information in its internal file notes concerning communications with legal counsel, UIM strategy and evaluation, and claim handling on the basis of “work product, attorney-client, confidential, mental impression, not relevant, and post litigation.” The redactions “appear to be an account of all updates made on the handling of Plaintiff’s claim by the claims adjuster….” Based on the earlier work product analysis, “any entries made prior to August 26, 2019 redacted on the basis of the work-product doctrine are discoverable and must be produced.”

This included the adjuster’s summary of the insured’s statement under oath.

“Any redactions made due to the attorney-client privilege are appropriately redacted, and need not be produced, as they are summaries of communications between the claims adjuster, in-house counsel, and outside counsel.”

Scope of permissible subjects for inquiry at deposition of corporate designee and adjuster

As stated above, plaintiff could not direct questions to either deponent about attorney-client communications.  Plaintiff could ask about underlying facts, even if those facts were also communicated to counsel for counsel’s consideration in evaluating the matter, regarding what facts were considered in not offering policy limits.

As to work product, per the above reasoning, “Plaintiff’s counsel must limit any questions under this matter for examination to the time period before August 26, 2019.”

Date of Decision:  May 27, 2021

Sanchez v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania No. CV 19-4016, 2021 WL 2156367 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 2021) (Perkin, M.J.)

NO BAD FAITH WHERE “RED FLAGS” EXISTED THAT COULD UNDERMINE COVERAGE; RULE TO FILE COMPLAINT NOT BAD FAITH (Middle District)

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

This case involved an auto accident death, and whether the deceased was an insured “family member” under his stepfather’s auto policy.  Coverage depends on whether the deceased resided with the named insured/step-father at the time of the accident.  The stepfather brought breach of contract and bad faith claims, on behalf of his stepson’s estate.

The court denied summary judgment to both parties on the coverage issues, as material facts remained open on the coverage issued.  As Judge Mannion states, “[i]n short, there exist too many disputed material facts as to whether [the stepson] was a ‘family member’ of plaintiff’s household at the time of the accident.”

The court did grant the insurer summary judgment on the bad faith claim, as plaintiff could not meet the clear and convincing evidence standard necessary to prove bad faith.

Judge Mannion observed that during its investigation, the insurer discovered that the stepson might not have met the definition of “family member” under the policy.  There were statements from two people that the stepson with living with his girlfriend and her mother, not the stepfather; that the stepfather had removed the stepson from the policy at issue; and that the deceased had purchased his own vehicle with its own insurance policy, and that policy had an address other than the stepfather’s address at the time of the accident.

While the stepson’s driver’s license and tax returns did indicate he resided with his stepfather, the insurer “certainly had sufficient evidence that showed [the stepson’s] physical residence was at [the girlfriend’s] house.”

Red flags oblige the insurer to investigate thoroughly

Looking at all the circumstances, Judge Mannion observed that “[u]nder Pennsylvania law, insurers are permitted to ‘conduct a thorough investigation’ of a questionable claim without acting in bad faith”, and “[w]here an insurer sees red flags’ that cause concern of insurance fraud and prompt an investigation, the insurer has a reasonable basis for investigation, and is therefore not liable for claims of bad faith.”  Here, the insurer “had more than a reasonable basis to investigate where [the stepson] was really residing at the time of the accident since it had ample evidence to show that he may have moved out of plaintiff’s house months before the accident.”

Under these circumstances, the insurer was “entitled to conduct its own investigation and its finding that [the stepson] was not residing with plaintiff and was not a covered family member as defined in plaintiff’s Policy was reasonably based on evidence it uncovered. Thus, defendant’s denial [of] plaintiff’s UIM claim made on behalf of [the stepson’s] Estate was not an act in reckless disregard of its obligations under plaintiff’s Policy.”

Rule to file a complaint not bad faith

The court also rejected the notion that the insurer acted “outrageously” in filing a rule to file a complaint, after plaintiff had initiated the action by way of writ of summons.  The insurer sought to have a complaint filed because it lacked information, and “instructed plaintiff to file a complaint so that it could develop the facts as to [the stepson’s] residence.” Judge Mannion added, “[i]ndeed, as defendant points out, the court held in Fabrikant v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., [a summary of which can be found here] …. that ‘an insurer’s exercising its procedural right to serve a Rule to File Complaint is not bad faith, absent a showing of clear and convincing evidence that such action was taken in bad faith.’” Here the insurer “was obliged to investigate where [the deceased] was physically residing at the time of the accident in order to properly consider plaintiff’s UIM claim, especially since there was evidence that his residence was at [another] house.” [Emphasis added]

Date of Decision:  April 1, 2021

Fuentes v. USAA General Indemnity Co., U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, No. CV 3:19-1111, 2021 WL 1225934 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2021) (Mannion, J.)

INSURER NOT REQUIRED TO PRODUCE PERSONNEL FILE, BUT IS REQUIRED TO (1) PROVIDE CORPORATE DESIGNEE FOR DEPOSITION, (2) PRODUCE MANUALS AND TRAINING MATERIALS WITHIN CERTAIN TIME/GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS, AND (3) PROVIDE CLAIMS FILES TO THE COURT FOR IN CAMERA REVIEW ON PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT (Philadelphia Federal)

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

The instant dispute involves the depositions of the claims handler and a corporate designee, as well as the scope of document discovery. The insurer made extensive objections to document requests accompanying the notices of deposition, and the any deposition of a corporate designee.  These are described in detail below.

This UIM bad faith case survived an earlier motion to dismiss, and was now proceeding on the merits before Magistrate Judge Perkin.  (Judge Leeson’s 2020 decision allowing the case to proceed is summarized here.)

General Discovery Principles

Magistrate Judge Perkin set out the basic principles guiding his decision:

  1. Rule 26 allows parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]”

  2. “Relevance is a broad concept that encompass[es] any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”

  3. “As an initial matter, therefore, all relevant material is discoverable unless an applicable evidentiary privilege is asserted. The presumption that such matter is discoverable, however, is defeasible.”

  4. “While the discovery rules are meant to be construed liberally, the responses sought [by a party] must comport with the traditional notions of relevancy and must not impose an undue burden on the responding party.”

  5. “To determine the scope of discoverable information under Rule 26(b)(1), the Court looks initially to the pleadings.”

  6. “In deciding which materials are discoverable and which are not, a district court must further distinguish between requests that ‘appear[ ] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ … and demands that are ‘overly broad and unduly burdensome.’”

Documents Requested in Connection with the Claim Handler’s Deposition

The insured did not object to the claim handler’s deposition, but did make multiple objections to the document requests accompanying the notice of deposition.

Manuals and Training Documents Subject to Limited Discovery

Plaintiff’s first request was for “[a]ny and all documents, policies, procedures, rules, regulations, manuals, training documents, or other documents or things relevant to the handling and/or evaluation of Underinsured Motorists claims during the period of 2015-2020.”

Plaintiff’s second request was for “[a] true and correct copy of the complete “Claims Manual/Claims Office Manual” or other such similar document(s) by whatever name or title used by Defendants for the handling of Underinsured Motorists benefits for the years 2015 through and including 2020.”

Plaintiff’s third request was for “[a] true and correct copy of the complete “Training Manual” or other such similar document(s) by whatever name or title used by Defendant for the purpose of training its employees in the handling of Underinsured Motorists benefits claims for the years 2015 through and including 2020.”

Plaintiff’s fourth request was for “[t]rue and correct copies of any and all claims bulletins, internal memoranda, letters, notices, or similar documents sent by management to the claims staff relating to the handling of Underinsured Motorists benefits claims for the years 2015 through and including 2020.”

The court found the first request relevant to both the breach of contract and bad faith claims, specifically ruling that manuals and other training materials are relevant to bad faith claims “where they contain instructions concerning procedures used by employees in processing claims.” Magistrate Judge Perkin added that “[t]raining materials ‘relevant to processing the claim in question’ are discoverable, as they may show, inter alia, ‘that agents of an insurance company recklessly disregarded standard interpretations of a particular contractual provision in denying coverage or deliberatively omitted certain investigatory steps.’”

However, Magistrate Judge Perkin agreed with the insurer that plaintiff’s requests were “overly broad in time, and should be limited to the period from when Defendant was first on notice of a UIM claim through the present.” First notice was when the insurer received correspondence from Plaintiff’s counsel informing Defendant of an anticipated underinsured motorist claim.

Magistrate Judge Perkin limited the geographic scope as well, “to those documents and materials governing underinsured motorist claims in Pennsylvania,” where the underlying accident occurred, where plaintiff resided, and the policy provided for UIM benefits under Pennsylvania law.

Magistrate Judge Perkin rejected the argument that the materials were trade secrets or proprietary in nature, pointing out there was no showing made to this effect but only “bare allegations that the information requested falls under this definition” which were insufficient “to protect such information from discovery.”

The court used the same analysis to address document requests 2-4.

Court Permits Discovery, with Limitations, of Claim Handling and Investigation Files

Plaintiff requested “[t]rue and correct copies of any and all letters, correspondence, documents, reports, or other records which relate to review, evaluation, and/or assessment of the causation or lack thereof of Plaintiff’s injuries following the underlying motor vehicle accident which was relied upon in the handling, assessment, investigation, and/or evaluation of Plaintiff’s UIM claim.”

Plaintiff also requested “[a]ny and all claims, notes, correspondence, records, recordings, documents, letters, phone logs, emails, or other communication writings or things pertaining to [the claim] from October 12, 2016 through present.”

Magistrate Judge Perkin observed that “an insurer, is not permitted to shield the discovery of its entire claims handling and investigation under the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine by hiring an attorney to perform its services. As Plaintiff noted in her brief, a bad faith claim may include “evidence of the insurer’s bad faith that occurred after the filing of the complaint.” The court reviewed the insurer’s privilege log and redacted documents, but could not determine whether the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine actually applied. Thus, Magistrate Judge Perkin ordered the insurer to make the full documents available for in camera review, including “internal file notes regarding communications with legal counsel … ; UIM strategy and evaluation; claim handling[;] Amount of reserves and legal expenses on the UIM and Medical Payment claims[;] … Evaluation Report for Plaintiff’s UIM claim [;] … internal emails regarding receipt of this lawsuit, and assignment to legal counsel … [;] ISO Claim Search report[; and] Asset report regarding [the tortfeasor driver], for consent to settle/waiver of UIM subrogation purposes[.]”

The second request quoted above was also subject to in camera review for the same reasons. The court added that “[t]o the extent that Defendant maintains any of the requested material outside of the web-based system, it shall produce such information immediately to Plaintiff unless it is appropriately protected by a privilege.”

These were limited to the time period from the date the insurer first had notice, as described above.

The insurer also requested “[a]ny and all claim files concerning Plaintiff’s claim for underinsured motorist benefits, in paper, electronic, and/or other available format.” Magistrate Judge Perkin ruled that “[a]s with the previous two requests, this Court will conduct an in camera review to determine if Defendant properly withheld documents related to this request. Defendant is not required to perform forensic investigation into its computing devices or systems to locate information existing prior to when Defendant’s duty to preserve evidence arose which is no longer accessible. Similarly, Defendant does not need to produce the same ESI in more than one form. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(iii). If Defendant maintains any information responsive to the above request in non-electronic forms, it shall produce such information immediately to Plaintiff unless it duplicative of what has already been produced or properly protected by a privilege.” [Emphasis in original]

Insurer not Compelled to Produce Personnel Files

The insured requested “[p]ersonnel file, including applications for employment, evaluations, awards, commendations, complaints, reprimands, resumes, attendance records for the period of 2016-2018, tests, performance appraisals, documents reflecting job performance and/or employee conduct, letters of commendation, reprimands, letters of termination, personnel action notices, investigative files and reports concerning or substantially concerning [the specific] Claims Specialist, only.”

Magistrate Judge Perkin ruled “[t]he request for personnel information implicates the strong public policy against disclosure of such materials.” Thus, “[w]hile information relating to [the claim handler’s] employment and job performance may be relevant to Plaintiff’s bad faith claim, Plaintiff may learn this information through less invasive means, such as by deposition or interrogatory. … Accordingly, while Plaintiff may obtain the employment information it seeks by deposing [the claim handler], or through interrogatories, Defendant is not compelled to produce the materials relating to the above request.”

Deposition of Corporate Designee Permitted

The court observed that corporate designees are called to testify about their personal knowledge only, but also to speak for the corporation “about matters to which the corporation has reasonable access.” In this case, the insured’s bad faith claim included allegations beyond valuation, “but also claims that defendant mishandled, failed to properly investigate and evaluate the claim and otherwise acted in bad faith.” Plaintiff wanted the 30(b)(6) designee “to represent the collective knowledge of the corporation and to present its positions on certain topics [,] including … “the manner and method of how Defendant instructs, advises, directs, and incentivizes its employees to handle claims is directly related to what, if anything, the adjuster(s) did in handling this claim and why.”

Magistrate Judge Perkin refused to quash the corporate designee’s deposition, finding the insured was “entitled to depose the corporate representative and obtain an official explanation of the claims-handling policies used by” the insurer.

He did not, however, stop there.  Rather, Magistrate Judge Perkin addressed objections to individual matters designated for examination and individual document requests accompanying the subpoena.

  1. “1st Matter for Examination: The thoughts, analysis, evaluation(s), rationale(s), investigation, actions, research, review, and reasoning of the handling adjuster’s supervisor at Defendant insurance company who personally participated in the decision to offer $6,000 on or about October 25, 2019, to resolve Plaintiff’s claim. (The term “participated” as used in this paragraph includes, without limitation, reviewed any documents, analyzed and/or discussed the matter with anyone, approved the offer of compromise or provided any information or input whatsoever into the decision).”

Magistrate Judge Perkin reserved ruling on this area of examination until after he had conducted the in camera review described above.

  1. “2nd Matter for Examination: The existence and content of any writings, files, procedures, claims-handling procedures, guidelines, claims manuals, or documents of any kind including any material contained in any computer which existed at any time from 2015 to the present, applicable to the handling and adjustment of Plaintiff’s claim.”

Magistrate Judge Pekin permitted this area of examination, to allow for questioning on “[t]he existence and content of any writings, files, procedures, claims-handling procedures, guidelines, claims manuals, or documents of any kind which existed from March 16, 2017 through 2020, applicable to the handling and adjustment of Plaintiff’s claim.”

  1. “3rd Matter for Examination: Defendant’s claims handling manuals, guidelines, or any other documents used to instruct personnel on the claims handling and/or adjustment practice used by State Farm to instruct/train/educate/direct or otherwise teach its claims adjusters to adjust first-party Underinsured Motorists (“UIM”) claims as of October 1, 2015.”

The court found this area of questioning relevant, within time and geographic limits, stating “[d]efendant’s claims handling manuals, guidelines, or any other documents used to instruct personnel on the claims handling and/or adjustment practice used by [the insurer] to instruct/train/educate/direct or otherwise teach its claims adjusters to adjust first-party Underinsured Motorists (“UIM”) claims in Pennsylvania from March 16, 2017 through 2020.”

  1. “4th Matter for Examination: State Farm’s policy, practice and procedure for promotion of claims representatives and/or adjusters within State Farm as of October 1, 2015 through the present.”

The court found the insurer’s “policies, practices, and procedures for promotions of claims representatives and adjusters is relevant to its claim of bad faith. To the extent that there are employee incentives to close out insureds’ claims, or handle claims in a particular manner, such information could reveal facts relevant to the motivations of the employees who handled Plaintiff’s claim.” Discovery was thus allowed, within a limited time frame.

  1. “5th Matter for Examination: Defendant’s training materials, practices, and procedures for claims adjusters handling UIM claims as of October 1, 2015 through the present.”

The court permitted discovery within time and geographic limits, “Defendant’s training materials, practices, and procedures for claims adjusters handling UIM claims in Pennsylvania as of March 16, 2017 through 2020.”

  1. “6th Matter for Examination: Defendant’s methods, policies, procedures, and practices used to calculate the value of damages in a UIM claim as of October 1, 2015 through the present.”

Again, the court permitted discovery within time and geographic limits, “Defendant’s methods, policies, procedures, and practices used to calculate the value of damages in a UIM claim in Pennsylvania as of March 16, 2017 through 2020.”

  1. “7th Matter for Examination: Any and all materials provided to claims adjusters handling UIM claims for the purpose of training claims adjusters and/or representatives as to calculating, evaluation, assessing, and determining value of damages as of October 1, 2015 through the present.”

Again, the court permitted discovery within time and geographic limits, “Any and all materials provided to claims adjusters handling UIM claims in Pennsylvania for the purpose of training claims adjusters and/or representatives as to calculating, evaluation, assessing, and determining value of damages as of March 16, 2017 through 2020.”

  1. “8th Matter for Examination: The policies and procedures for evaluating, assessing, and investigating personal injuries to an insured in a UIM claim as of October 1, 2015 through the present.”

Again, the court permitted discovery within time and geographic limits, “The policies and procedures for evaluating, assessing, and investigating personal injuries to an insured in a UIM claim in Pennsylvania as of March 16, 2017 through 2020.”

The court next addressed the document requests accompanying the corporate designee’s notice of deposition.

  1. “Request 1: Any and all claims manuals, reference materials, training manuals, and/or guidelines for interpretation of the relevant insurance policy.”

Following his analysis in addressing the document requests accompanying the claim handler’s notice of deposition, Magistrate Judge Perkin found the request relevant to the bad faith claim, within the limited time period.  To the extent the response would be identical to the other request, however, he would not require a separate production; rather, the defendant could cross reference that earlier production to bates numbers.

  1. “Request 2: Any and all documents, materials, manuals, guides, claims manuals, handbooks, training materials or other items relating to the topics set forth above.”

Again following the same request to the claim handler, the documents were relevant to the bad faith claim within a limited time period, and the same process of cross-referencing to bates numbers could be followed.

  1. “Request 3: The personnel files of all company employees who worked on Plaintiff’s UIM claim.”

Again following the earlier analysis, the insurer was not required to produce written materials, leaving the insured to pursue that employment information through the deposition or interrogatories.

Date of Decision:  January 22, 2021

SOLANO-SANCHEZ v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO INSURANCE COMPANY, U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania No. CV 19-4016, 2021 WL 229400 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2021) (Perkin, M.J.)

NO BAD FAITH FOR EVEN NEGLIGENT CLAIM HANDLING, AND WHERE INSURER’S POSITION WAS SUPPORTED BY AN EXPERT (Philadelphia Federal)

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

This UIM bad faith case had survived a motion to dismiss, but summary judgment ended the plaintiff’s bad faith claim.

Eastern District Judge Leeson had originally allowed the bad faith claim to proceed, as plaintiff had alleged more than a valuation dispute.  Our prior blog post can be found here.

The present bad faith summary judgment motion was before Magistrate Judge Perkin. His opinion goes through the claim handling history in minute detail.  Among other things, it shows nearly a year passed before the insured provided the claim handlers with all medical records and details on the specific injuries for which he was seeking full UIM policy limits.  The record shows the insurer assigned a specialist in medical resources (SMR) to review the medical file, and later had a medical examination performed by a physician. Discovery appeared to show potential errors in the SMR’s evaluation.

Based on the medical reviews, the insurer had not paid its full UIM limits, as plaintiff demanded, at the time suit was filed.  The insured challenged the conclusions of both the SMR and the physician on the origin and scope of his injuries in bringing the bad faith claim.

Magistrate Judge Perkin observed that an “insurance company need not show that the process used to reach its conclusion was flawless or that its investigatory methods eliminated possibilities at odds with its conclusions. Rather, an insurance company simply must show that it conducted a review or investigation sufficiently thorough to yield a reasonable foundation for its action.”  Thus, “[e]ven if Defendant’s claims-handling processes were not ideal, there is no evidence in the record, let alone clear and convincing evidence, to indicate that Defendant’s purported mishandling of Plaintiff’s claim was motivated by a dishonest purpose or ill will.”

Citing older case law, the court states, “while under Pennsylvania law bad faith may extend to an insurer’s investigation and other conduct in handling the claim, that conduct must ‘import a dishonest purpose.’” “Invariably, this requires that the insurer lack a reasonable basis for denying coverage, as mere negligence or aggressive protection of an insurer’s interests is not bad faith.”

[Note: In 2017, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court made clear in Rancosky that “we hold that proof of an insurance company’s motive of self-interest or ill-will is not a prerequisite to prevailing in a bad faith claim under Section 8371, as argued by Appellant. While such evidence is probative of the second Terletsky prong, we hold that evidence of the insurer’s knowledge or recklessness as to its lack of a reasonable basis in denying policy benefits is sufficient.” A link to our Rancosky summary can be found here.]

Applying this law to the facts, Magistrate Judge Perkin found that “[a]lthough the plaintiff disagrees with the conclusions of both [the SMR and the carrier’s physician], it is clear that [the carrier] had a reasonable basis to value the claim based, at a minimum, on [the physician’s] report.” Assuming that the SMR “performed an insufficient and incorrect medical review of Plaintiff’s case, Defendant did not deny Plaintiff’s claim based upon that review, but rather continued its investigation of Plaintiff’s claim. Moreover, it is not apparent on the record that Defendant has ever denied coverage to Plaintiff.”

As to how the insurer handled the various bodily injury claims, the plaintiff’s doctors had sourced these all to the auto accident at issue, while the carrier’s physician only identified some of these injuries as being caused by the accident. Thus, Magistrate Judge Perkin found:

“Similarly, the fact that the plaintiff’s experts relate all of the plaintiff’s right knee and left ankle complaints to the accident does not provide a basis for bad faith. Defendant retained [an] orthopedic surgeon … to perform an independent medical examination and records review. After completing same, [defendant’s surgeon] concluded that that only the plaintiff’s initial meniscal tear and resultant arthroscopic surgery were related to the accident. None of the plaintiff’s left ankle complaints/treatments, or additional right knee treatment, was accident-related. Accordingly, [the carrier] had a reasonable basis for its claim handling.”

Date of Decision:  January 13, 2021

Perez-Garcia v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, No. CV 18-3783, 2021 WL 131343 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2021) (Perkin, M.J.)

INSURER COMPELLED TO PRODUCE “BEST PRACTICES” GUIDE (Western District)

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

In this case, Western District Magistrate Judge Kelly ordered production of the insurer’s claim handling guidelines.

The insurer denied UIM coverage, claiming the insureds waived their benefits. The carrier conceded its UIM waiver forms did not comply with Pennsylvania law, but took the position it still properly denied the claim under the circumstances.  The insureds sued for breach of contract and bad faith.

The insured’s document requests sought “all written policies, claims and manuals, company manuals, operational guidelines, and/or any other policies, procedures, guidelines, manuals, and/or instructional/educational material pertaining to the handling of underinsured motorist claims ….” The insurer objected on the basis that these documents were confidential and proprietary, but that “if plaintiffs’ counsel will agree to sign a confidentiality order, [the insurer] will produce a copy of the Table of Contents for its claims manual and the plaintiffs can identify which chapter or chapters they believe they need to review.”

The carrier later stated there were no claim manuals, but rather the insurer maintained a “Best Practices” guide. The insurer produced part of its Best Practices guide, with redactions and removed pages, regarding liability, subrogation, and first party medical benefits. The redactions were not specifically identified and there was no privilege log.

The insured moved to compel greater production.

The carrier responded that “evidence of claims handling is irrelevant to this proceeding because the … claim was ‘never ‘handled’ since [the carrier] concluded there was nothing to handle.” It also took the position that neither liability nor the nature and extent of the injuries were in dispute, and the only issue was whether coverage was properly denied.

Separately, the carrier objected to production because such “production would otherwise cause it harm based on the nature of the plaintiffs’ counsel’s law firm; that is, a well-advertised law firm that represents ‘injured people.’” Apparently, the carrier was concerned that plaintiffs’ counsel would use its manual in future lawsuits, brought by different plaintiffs against the insurer.

In addressing the insureds’ motion to compel, the court first observed that claims manuals and training materials are “relevant [in bad faith cases] because the manuals contain instructions concerning procedures used by insurance company employees in handling UIM claims, like Plaintiffs’ claims herein. Though departures from established standards in handling a UIM claim would not alone establish bad faith, such information ‘is probative evidence for plaintiff to demonstrate bad faith.’”

The court rejected the insurer’s argument that it did not have to produce these materials because there had been no claim handling. “That [the insurer] failed to process the claim at all does not necessarily render guidelines as to how claims are ordinarily processed irrelevant and, at this stage of the proceedings, it cannot be said that the information sought is unrelated to the facts at issue.” The insureds had agreed that discovery could have some limits, and the insurer did not have to produce materials in the Best Practices guide “pertaining to rental vehicles, property damage, vehicle theft, and other sections unrelated to the evaluat[ion] and/or handling of an injury claim….”

Thus, the insureds “met their initial burden to establish the relevance of the requested material within the broad scope of permissible discovery and [the insurer] failed to adequately show that the information, limited to the handling of UIM claims for bodily injury, is irrelevant simply because it denied the claim.”

As to the second objection, the court found nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposing a discovery “limitation based on a law firm’s advertising budget or the nature of its legal representation of injured persons….” Any concern that these materials might be used in some future litigation could be addressed with plaintiff’s counsel in negotiating and drafting an appropriate confidentiality agreement.

Thus, the insurer had to produce the Best Practices guide, with only the redactions and limitations described above.

Date of Decision: December 9, 2020

Keeler v. Esurance Insurance Services, Inc., U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania No. CV 20-271, 2020 WL 7239568 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2020) (Kelly, M.J.)

BAD FAITH CLAIM DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO PLEAD SUFFICIENT FACTS (THE FIVE Ws) TO ESTABLISH KNOWLEDGE OR RECKLESS DISREGARD (Philadelphia Federal)

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

This is the latest of many 2020 bad faith cases dismissed for failing to allege more than conclusory allegations. It is the second opinion this month finding a bad faith plaintiff failed to plead the necessary scientir element, even if unreasonableness in denying a benefit was alleged sufficiently.

In this UIM breach of contract and bad faith case, the insured alleged “that (1) she provided notice of the loss and her intent to pursue underinsured motorist benefits from [the insurer], (2) she demanded payment and submitted medical records to substantiate that demand, (3) [the insurer] failed to investigate thoroughly and fairly, (4) [the insurer] failed to communicate with [the insured], (5) [the insurer] has refused to pay the demand, and (6) as a result, [the insured] has and continues to suffer loss and damages.”

The insurer moved to dismiss the bad faith claim.

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint. To provide a defendant with fair notice, a plaintiff must provide ‘more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Third Circuit instructs the reviewing court to conduct a two-part analysis. First, any legal conclusions are separated from the well-pleaded factual allegations and disregarded. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Second, the court determines whether the facts alleged establish a plausible claim for relief.”

The present complaint “fails to include specific facts regarding [the insurer’s] actions, including those which would support a bad faith claim. District courts in this circuit ‘have routinely dismissed bad faith claims reciting only ‘bare-bones’ conclusory allegations unsupported by facts sufficient to raise the claims to a level of plausibility.’”

In support, Judge Pratter cites Judge Pappert’s Elican decision, Judge Slomsky’s Toner decision, and Judge Buckwalter’s Pasqualino decision.

The insured failed to plead the “Five Ws”, i.e., “the who, what, where, when, why,” “and how [the insurer’s] conduct plausibly constitutes bad faith.” Even where cursory claims might be sufficient to plausibly plead an unreasonable benefit denial, there still have to be sufficient allegations for a court to “plausibly infer that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded a lack of a reasonable basis to deny benefits.” This split between adequately alleging unreasonableness and knowledge was present in, e.g., Pasqualino.

More recently, just one day before Judge Pratter’s opinion issued in this case, Judge Quiñones Alejandro issued her opinion in White v. Travelers, summarized earlier this week. Just as in Judge Pratter’s opinion and Pasqualino, Judge Quiñones Alejandro found the insured failed to get beyond conclusory allegations in asserting the insurer acted knowingly or recklessly in denying a benefit.

Finally, Judge Pratter cited to the Third Circuit’s Smith opinion, summarized here, reminding parties and the courts that “the mere ‘failure to immediately accede to a demand for the policy limit cannot, without more, amount to bad faith.’”

Judge Pratter did give the insured leave to amend, rather than dismissing the bad faith claim with prejudice.

Date of Decision:  December 8, 2020

Satterfield v. GEICO, U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania No. CV 20-1400, 2020 WL 7229763 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2020) (Pratter, J.)