Archive for the 'PA – No coverage duty, no bad faith' Category
The Third Circuit’s precedential decision focused primarily on what constitutes a sufficient writing to request lower underinsured motorist limits under 75 Pa. C.S. § 1734. That statute only provides there must be a “request in writing”. After close analysis, the panel determined that such a request can effectively be made in the insurance application itself, without the need for using a specialized form.
“The statute says little beyond that [there must be a request in writing]. But that silence speaks volumes. As we reiterate today, the statute means what it says: an insured can make that choice ‘in writing’ in any writing as long as the choice is clear.”
In this case, the insured requested lower than the maximum UIM limits in her written insurance application. After suffering a serious injury, and despite the application asking for lower limits and the policy being issued with those lower limits, the insured demanded the maximum UIM limits allowed by statute.
She argued the application request was not binding because she had not filled out a separate form the insurer itself provided, which was designed for the insured to expressly acknowledge she was accepting these lower limits. The insurer took the position that even without the insurer filling out the acknowledgment form, the written request in the application was sufficient to set lower limits for UIM coverage, and refused to pay full limits allowed by the statute.
The insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith. The district court agreed with the insured on the policy limit issued, but dismissed the bad faith claim. The case proceeded to trial and jury awarded $1.75 million, which the trial judge molded to $750,000 to meet the UIM maximum, rather than the lower sum requested in the application.
A summary of the trial court’s decision can be found here.
For the reasons stated above, the Third Circuit reversed and found the lower limit requested in the application controlling. It ordered the trial court to mold the verdict to $300,000.
The Third Circuit did affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the insured’s bad faith claim. The insured tried to attack the bad faith claim’s dismissal, post-verdict, via a motion for reconsideration.
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First, the appellate panel agreed with the trial court that the jury verdict was irrelevant to bad faith, and that the trial court should solely look “at the actions and omissions of [the insurer] to evaluate [the insured’s] claim when it was submitted and then processed. [Note: We recently posted on a New Jersey federal decision similarly rejecting this type of “hindsight” bad faith analysis.]
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As the arguments were presented by motion for reconsideration, there had to be some new facts that did not exist or could not have been discovered at the time of the original decision. The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the insured’s efforts in this regard failed, as the facts she wanted to adduce were not new.
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The insured failed to request certain documents in discovery, e.g., the insurer’s Best Practices Manual, and gave no justification. Further, the Rule 26(f) report revealed early on the insurer’s position about the lower limit in the application controlling the UIM policy limits. Thus, there was no basis for reconsideration involving discovery activities.
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In bringing and pursuing her case, the insured did not argue the insurer acted in bad faith on the basis of misrepresenting the scope of coverage, even though she had information allegedly supporting such a claim before trial. Rather, she “chose instead to base [the] bad faith claim on an alleged failure … to investigate the [insured’s] claim.” The court would not allow the insured belatedly to bring up the misrepresentation based claim, finding there should be no second bite at the apple.
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The Third Circuit observed that an insurer can defeat a bad faith claim if there “is evidence of a reasonable basis for the insurer’s actions or inaction.” In this case, the insurer believed the application constituted a sufficient writing under section 1734 to reduce UIM coverage limits. The Third Circuit found the insurer’s belief, “not only reasonable but correct.” Thus, its “reliance on the lower UM/UIM coverage limits in informing its investigation and settlement offers was therefore not deceptive.”
Date of Decision: April 8, 2021
Gibson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit No. 20-1589, 2021 WL 1310777 (3d Cir. Apr. 8, 2021) (Hardiman, Pratter, Roth, JJ.)
On March 30, 2021, Eastern District Judges Beetlestone and Baylson independently issued opinions finding no insurance coverage due for business losses resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic. In both cases, plaintiffs not only demanded coverage, but asserted bad faith claims against their insurers.
Motions to dismiss were granted in both cases, with prejudice, the courts finding no coverage due for the types of losses claimed. We leave you to read these cases in detail on the issues of physical loss or damage, direct loss or damage, governmental closures, business losses, and the other issues now regularly before the courts on Covid-19 business interruption and government closure claims.
Neither court gave any lengthy address to the bad faith claims, or even an express analysis for their dismissal. By comparison, the breach of contract and declaratory relief claims over coverage were addressed in detail.
The first element of any bad faith claim is that the claim denial is unreasonable. In dismissing the bad faith claims, with prejudice, it seems fair to infer that because the coverage denial was correct under the policy language, these courts found no bad faith possible, i.e., where the coverage denial is correct under the relevant policy language, it is impossible to prove the carrier acted unreasonably, thus precluding a finding of bad faith.
Dates of Decision: March 30, 2021
Tria WS LLC, v. American Automobile Insurance Company, U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, No. CV 20-4159, 2021 WL 1193370 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2021) (Beetlestone, J.) COVID
The Third Circuit affirmed a Western District decision finding no UIM coverage due because the insured rejected stacking. While not discussed in the appellate opinion, the trial court observed there could be no bad faith case if no coverage was due. This point is not expressly addressed by the Third Circuit, but it did affirm on all claims, including bad faith.
A summary of the lower court’s decision can be found here.
Dunleavy v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit No. 20-2100, 2021 WL 1042981 (3d Cir. Mar. 18, 2021) (Matey, Schwartz, Traxler, JJ.)
The insured brings this breach of contract and bad faith case based on the insurer’s denying virtually all of her water damage claim, and its allegedly improper claim handling in communications to the insured. Western District Magistrate Judge Dodge grants the insurer’s motion to dismiss, but with leave to file an amended complaint.
First, the court dismissed the breach of contract claim. Magistrate Judge Dodge found there was no coverage for the claims pleaded because the damages specifically alleged, when compared to the clear policy language, were not insured losses. There was, however, enough ambiguity in the plaintiff’s allegation that she suffered “resulting damages”, to allow the insured to amend if she could identify any other forms of damages that might be covered under the policy.
As to the bad faith claim, Magistrate Judge Dodge first observed that her contract ruling explained how the coverage denial was proper. Further, “[t]he bad faith claim does not refer to any circumstances other than [plaintiff’s] contention that [the insurer] failed to communicate all of the policy language to her in one of its letters.” This was of no moment. The policy exclusion language omitted in the letter was irrelevant because the insurer did not rely on the omitted exclusion in denying coverage.
The insured alleged that the insurer also omitted a distinct important policy provision in correspondence to the insured. This was belied, however, by the correspondence itself. The purportedly omitted provision actually was included in the letter. Moreover, even if the omission occurred, this amounted at most to negligence, mistake, or poor judgment, none of which makes out an actionable bad faith claim.
Thus, the motion to dismiss the bad faith claim was granted, but without prejudice.
Date of Decision: March 19, 2021
Blanton v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania Civil Action No. 20-1534, 2021 WL 1060661 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2021) (Dodge, M.J.)
Our thanks to the insurer’s counsel, Mark A. Martini, of Robb Leonard Mulvihill LLP, for bringing this case to our attention.
The court dismissed the insured’s breach of contract claim because the damages were speculative. The court then dismissed the bad faith claim because there was no predicate cause of action on which the bad faith claim rested. Both dismissals were without prejudice.
Middle District Judge Wilson ruled as follows:
A bad faith claim under section 8371 is distinct from the predicate claim. Nealy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 695 A.2d 790, 793 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (ruling bad faith claims are distinct from underlying contract claims). As such, there must be a predicate contract claim in order for a section 8371 claim to proceed. Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire. Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 524, 530 (3d Cir. 1997) (observing that “a section 8371 claim may not be the sole claim of an insured”). A breach of contract claim can serve as one such predicate action. See, e.g., Rancoscky, 170 A.3d at 161 (recognizing a section 8371 claim brought along with a breach of contract claim). While the predicate claim need not be tried together with the section 8371 claim, the predicate cause of action “must be ripe for a § 8371 claim to be recognized.” Polselli, 126 F.3d at 530. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also recognized this requirement. See Ash v Continental Ins. Co., 593 Pa. 523, 932 A.2d 877, 882 (Pa. 2007) (holding that section 8371 “applies only in limited circumstances—i.e., where the insured has first filed ‘an action arising under an insurance policy’ against his insurer”).
In this case, while Moses Taylor has alleged a breach of contract claim along with its section 8371 bad faith claim, the court’s dismissal of the breach of contract claim removes the predicate cause of action otherwise required to accompany the section 8371 claim. As another court within this circuit has articulated, a bad faith claim in a vacuum is not actionable. MP III Holdings, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 08-CV-4958, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72370, at *83–88 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2011). Thus, because there are no other actionable claims raised in this case that could serve as a predicate cause of action, Moses Taylor’s section 8371 claim for bad faith will be dismissed without prejudice to reinstatement if the breach of contract claim is replead. See Polselli, 126 F.3d at 530.
This Blog has long discussed the argument that there is no statutory bad faith claim possible absent the denial of a benefit, i.e., either a refusal to defend or indemnify third party claims, or to pay damages on first party claims. See this post as one of many examples.
Date of Decision: March 17, 2021
Moses Taylor Foundation v. Coverys & Proselect Insurance Co., U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania No. 3:20-CV-00990, 2021 WL 1017371 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2021) (Wilson, J.)
In this breach of contract and common law bad faith action, on a lawyer’s professional liability policy, the court found a number of bases for denying coverage. As such, the insurer had a reasonable basis to deny coverage and there could be no bad faith. Thus, the court granted the insurer’s summary judgment motion.
First, because this was a claims made policy, “Pennsylvania law does not require an insurer to demonstrate prejudice when the relevant notice provision is contained in a claims-made policy like the one before us.” The court found the insured did not give the required notice in a timely manner.
Next, to the extent no damages were sought, there was no coverage due under the policy.
In addition, there was no coverage due because some of the claims against the insured did not arise out of legal services, as required by the policy
Further, the court found a number of exclusions applicable, and no coverage was due on this additional basis.
Finally, as to bad faith, the court stated: “That leaves only [the insured’s claims] for breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing (i.e., bad faith). However, because [the insurer] had a reasonable basis for denying coverage under the policy, we grant summary judgment in favor of [the insurer].” In support, the court cited a 2004 case for the proposition that the insurer should be successful where it “’reasonably believed that [the insured] had forfeited coverage under the Policy by failing to timely comply with the notice provision,’ and ‘[t]hus, the [insurance company’s] actions cannot be the basis for a bad faith claim[.]’”
Date of Decision: March 9, 2021
Middle District Judge Jones ruled that no Covid-19 coverage was due under an all-risk policy.
He found no “direct physical loss of or damage to property,” eliminating the possibility of coverage for business income losses or claims that the business closure resulted from a government order. Further, even if covered, the claims were subject to the policy’s virus exclusion.
Thus, Judge Jones held plaintiff failed to make out its claims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and granted the insurer’s motion to dismiss those claims. Although not a bad faith case, Judge Jones observed in a footnote, “[s]imilarly, Pennsylvania courts have held that if the insurer properly denied a claim, the policyholder is unable to state a bad faith claim.”
Date of Decision: February 8, 2021
There can be no bad faith where no coverage is due, or where coverage is a close question based on unsettled law.
Court Applies Kvaerner to ALL Reasonably Foreseeable Damages Resulting from Faulty Workmanship
Middle District Judge Brann addressed an expanding body of case law in Pennsylvania’s Superior Court that would appear to require coverage for damages flowing from faulty workmanship, even if the faulty workmanship itself is not covered. He rejected, however, the Superior Court’s interpretation of what constitutes a covered occurrence under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2006 Kvaerner decision.
[We have previously posted on Kvaerner in the context of coverage and otherwise, with two case summaries in 2019, here and here, this 2018 case summary, this 2014 summary, in 2013 on the Superior Court’s Indalex decision in relation to Kvaerner, and in this 2009 summary.]
Judge Brann relied on Third Circuit precedent emphasizing that all reasonably foreseeable damages resulting from faulty workmanship do not constitute an occurrence, whether that is damage to the product being constructed or damages to property beyond the scope of the construction contract resulting from that faulty workmanship.
Thus, e.g., in Judge Brann’s and the Third Circuit’s perspective, if a contractor improperly installs a roof, the roof leaks, and other parts of the building or personal property are damaged, there is no occurrence for this other damage to third party property, even though it is beyond the contracted work itself, if that other damage is reasonably foreseeable. By contrast, the new Superior Court cases would find this third party damage outside the scope of the actual construction work to be a covered occurrence, even if reasonably foreseeable.
Judge Brann observes, “Despite the caselaw that has emerged from the Superior Court, the [District] Court notes that it is not bound by these decisions. As the Third Circuit has explained, although courts should ‘give due deference to the decisions of intermediate state courts…[s]tate appellate decisions…are not controlling.’ Thus, ‘while [courts] may not ignore the decision of an intermediate appellate court, [they] are free to reach a contrary result if, by analyzing other persuasive data, [they] predict that the State Supreme Court would hold otherwise.’”
In the present case, Judge Brann held no coverage due to replace a roof that had been improperly constructed. Further, there was no coverage due to areas of the roof damaged that were outside the scope of the contracted roof work, which also had to be replaced as a result of the faulty construction, as these third party property damages were reasonably foreseeable. Thus, he granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the insurer as to coverage.
No Bad Faith Where no Coverage Due
On the insured’s bad faith claim, Judge Brann likewise granted judgment on the pleadings. First, he observed that the insurer properly denied benefits. Thus, he found there could be no bad faith because the insurer “certainly had ‘a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy,’ meaning that [the insured] cannot demonstrate bad faith.”
Judge Brann then added, “even if this Court were incorrect in its decision that [the insurer] owes no duty to indemnify [the insured], the duty to indemnify is, at the very least, debatable, in light of the differing conclusions reached by the Superior Court and the Third Circuit. Given that the caselaw in this area does not establish a clear duty … to indemnify …, it cannot be said that [the insurer] had no reasonable basis to deny benefits.”
Date of Decision: January 26, 2021
These two Covid-19 coverage cases ended in summary judgments against the insureds on their breach of contract and statutory bad faith claims. Eastern District Judge Kenney decided both cases last Thursday (1/14/2021).
Case 1: Clear Hearing Solutions v. Continental Casualty
Covid-19 Business Coverage Issues
In Clear Hearing Solutions, the insured had two all-risk policies. Plaintiffs were Pennsylvania entities, but they had hearing service stores closed in Maryland and North Carolina due to government shutdowns. The insureds alleged they were entitled to “Business Income coverage, Extra Expense Coverage, Extended Business Income coverage, and Civil Authority coverage,” but the carrier denied coverage.
Judge Kenney observed that direct physical loss of property or damage to property were essential to all these coverages. He followed the principles that “[t]he criteria for physical loss caused by a source unnoticeable to the naked eye is thus whether the functionality of the…property was nearly eliminated or destroyed, or whether the[ ] property was made useless or uninhabitable by that source.” (internal quotation marks omitted) The mere presence of the contaminating source material, however, “or the general threat of future damage from that presence, lacks the distinct and demonstrable character necessary for first-party insurance coverage.”
Judge Kenney states:
The Court agrees with and adopts the conclusion reached by another Court in this district. In 4431, Inc. et al v. Cincinnati Ins. Cos., the Court concluded that, “under Pennsylvania law, for Plaintiffs to assert an economic loss resulting from their inability to operate their premises as intended within the coverage of the Policy’s ‘physical loss’ provision, the loss and the bar to operation from which it results must bear a causal relationship to some physical condition of the premises.” No. 5:20-cv-04396, 2020 WL 7075318, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2020) (emphasis in original). There must also be an “element correlating to [the] extent of operational utility – i.e., a premises must be uninhabitable and unusable, or nearly as such.” Id; see also Brian Handel D.M.D. v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 20-3198, 2020 WL 6545893 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2020) (finding Port Authority and Hardinger preclude a finding of “direct physical loss of or damage to” property where it remained inhabitable and usable, albeit in limited ways). In sum, while structural damage is not required to show “direct physical loss of” property, the source that destroys the property’s utility must have something to do with the physical condition of the premises.
The Clear Hearing insureds conceded there was no Covid-19 on the premises, and their losses resulted from government directed business closures. “Because Clear Hearing expressly denies the existence of anything affecting the physical condition of its premises, its losses are a mere loss of use untethered to the physical condition of the property itself. Reading ‘direct physical loss of or damage to property’ to contemplate mere loss of use is not a reasonable interpretation because it renders two other Policy provisions superfluous or nonsensical.”
Judge Kenney then goes into a more detailed analysis as to why there is no covered physical damage or property loss from Covid-19, which are discussed in the opinion at length.
He further observes that simply because the policy lacks a virus exclusion, this does not create coverage by implication. “But ‘[a] loss which does not properly fall within the coverage clause cannot be regarded as covered thereby merely because it is not within any of the specific exceptions….’ And it is at least plausible that the physical manifestation of some type of virus could cause covered losses. That situation is just not present here.”
Judge Kenney also finds that the Maryland and North Carolina “government orders cannot constitute a covered cause of loss under either the Business Income and Extra Expense coverages or the Civil Authority Coverage provisions.” Further, there was no genuine factual issue “as to whether the government orders were issued due to physical loss of or damage to nearby property,” and the insured could not show access to the premises was prohibited entirely for all purposes by these government orders.
Bad Faith Issues
[Note: We have observed numerous times over the years there is a strong argument that cognizable statutory bad faith claims in Pennsylvania require that the insured must have be denied an actual benefit, i.e., a payment of first party damages due or a refusal to defend and indemnify against third party claims due. Thus, as repeated on this blog ad naseum, there is a genuine issue as to whether an independent statutory bad faith claim for poor investigation practices is cognizable when no coverage is otherwise due under a policy. For example, see this post from January 2020, this post from August 2020, and this post from earlier in August 2020.]
The Clear Hearing opinion states that statutory bad faith is an independent cause of action from a breach of contract action. If the statutory bad faith claim, however, “is premised solely on the denial of coverage, the claim must necessarily fail if a court finds that no coverage exists.” Judge Kenney adds, “[o]n the other hand, ‘if bad faith is asserted as to conduct beyond a denial of coverage, the bad faith claim is actionable as to that conduct regardless of whether the contract claim survives.’” Further, “[t]hat distinction has been accepted when, for example, an insured claims the insurer investigated his claim in bad faith in addition to a bad-faith denial of coverage.”
The bulk of Clear Hearing’s bad faith claims were based on coverage denials, and these claims were readily dismissed because no coverage was ever due. Judge Kenney then goes on to address the claim handling based bad faith arguments, accepting the possibility that statutory bad faith might still exist even when no coverage is due and no benefit has actually been denied.
Clear Hearing argued that there was bad faith based on the claim handling because Continental immediately denied the claim and did not conduct any investigation, while further failing to address or acknowledge the insureds’ interpretation of the policy language on direct physical loss. Rather, Continental relied “on case law providing a restrictive interpretation of the term direct physical loss to deny its claim as part of a policy to limit the company’s losses during the pandemic.” (internal quotation marks omitted).
Judge Kenney rejected this argument:
To the extent that these allegations may be construed to extend beyond bad faith in the denial itself to bad faith in the investigatory process or process of denial, Clear Hearing has not met its burden. In the context of a claim for coverage based solely on government closure orders, and on Civil Authority orders where nearby property has not suffered direct physical loss of or damage to property and access to plaintiff’s property has not been prohibited, there is nothing to investigate: coverage does not exist on the face of that claim. Therefore, Clear Hearing has not shown bad faith in Continental’s lack of investigation or by denying Clear Hearing’s claim “in light of the current context of mass denials of COVID-19 related business interruption claims.” Discovery on this issue would not change that conclusion. Nor does Continental’s purported reliance on caselaw that this Court concludes correctly interprets “direct physical loss of or damage to” with respect to Clear Hearing’s claims indicate bad faith. Accordingly, Clear Hearing has not shown its entitlement to damages on its bad faith claim or an existence of a dispute of material fact as to Continental’s bad faith.
Case 2: Ultimate Hearing Solutions v. Twin City Fire Insurance
Plaintiffs were Pennsylvania entities with businesses located in Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, which were subject to government closure orders due to Covid-19. They likewise had all-risk policies, but with a different insurer than the Clear Hearing plaintiffs. The Ultimate Hearing plaintiffs were represented by the same counsel as in the Clear Hearing case. These plaintiffs brought similar breach of contract and bad faith claims.
On the coverage, Judge Kenney applied the same reasoning found in Clear Hearing to conclude there was no covered direct physical loss or damage to property.
There were two differences, however, between the Ultimate Hearing and Clear Hearing all-risk policies. The Ultimate Healing policies included (1) limited coverage for fungi, wet rot, dry rot, bacteria, and viruses; and (2) a virus exclusion.
In rejecting limited virus coverage, Judge Kenney stated, “the Limited Virus Coverage clearly states that the Policy only covers ‘Direct physical loss or direct physical damage to Covered Property caused by … virus.’ Plaintiffs did not allege that the coronavirus was present at any of their insured properties. They also have not shown, as discussed above, physical loss or damage to their properties.”
Judge Kenney further rejected the argument that the limited virus coverage was illusory, because “Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge that this Limited Virus Coverage provision also applies to fungi, wet rot, dry rot, and bacteria, not just viruses. While it may be difficult to think of a hypothetical situation where a virus causes physical damage to a property, it is not difficult to imagine that wet rot, dry rot or fungi can cause damage that would satisfy the ‘direct physical loss or direct physical damage’ requirement. Further, while it may be difficult to imagine, Defendants did in fact identify a case where insured property was damaged due to a virus caused by a Covered Cause of Loss.”
Judge Kenney also found the virus exclusion precluded coverage.
The bad faith arguments were similar to those made in Clear Hearing, but without reference to the insurer’s improperly relying on caselaw to deny coverage. Rather, the argument was phrased as a refusal to consider the insureds reasonable interpretation of the policy language concerning direct physical loss.
Judge Kenney rejected the bad faith claim handling argument, stating as in Clear Hearing:
In the context of a claim for coverage based solely on the Closure Orders where there are no claims that the insured property or nearby property has been physically damaged and access to Plaintiffs’ property has not been entirely prohibited, there is nothing to investigate: coverage does not exist on the face of that claim. Therefore, Ultimate Hearing Solutions has not shown bad faith in Twin City’s lack of investigation or by denying Ultimate Hearing Solutions’ claim “in light of the current context of mass denials of COVID-19 related business interruption claims.” Discovery on this issue would not change that conclusion. Accordingly, Ultimate Hearing Solutions has not shown its entitlement to damages on its bad faith claim or an existence of a dispute of material fact as to Twin City’s bad faith.
Date of Decision: January 14, 2021
Clear Hearing Solutions, LLC v. Continental Casualty Co., U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania No. 20-3454, 2021 WL 131283 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2021) (Kenney, J.)
Published on
December 17, 2020 in
PA - Claims Handling (reasonable), PA - Common Law Bad Faith (contractual or fiduciary basis), PA - Coverage Issues, PA - Discovery and Evidence, PA - Insurer wrong, but reasonable, PA - Law unsettled, PA - No coverage due, bad faith still possible, PA - No coverage duty, no bad faith and PA - Standing, Assignment or Outside Scope.
The Third Circuit addressed the central issue of whether the defendant was an insured, and how to analyze that factual issue in ruling on coverage and bad faith claims.
The named insured went with his girlfriend to a picnic, where they met up with the mother of the named insured’s child. The girlfriend was also a named insured, but the mother was a stranger to the insurance contract. The mother decided to move the named insureds’ car, and struck plaintiff while driving the car. The injured plaintiff sued the two named insureds and the mother.
The carrier covered the named insureds, but took the position that the mother was not a permissive user and therefore was not an insured under the policy. The mother stipulated to a judgment and assigned her bad faith and breach of contract claims to the injured plaintiff, who sued the carrier.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, and the Third Circuit affirmed.
The Four Corners Rule does not Apply to Determining if a Party is an Insured for Duty to Defend Purposes
The Third Circuit first addressed the issue of whether the four corners rule encompasses determinations of whether a party is an insured in the first instance.
The issue has never been addressed by Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court.
The insurer argued it could not be bad faith to take the position the mother was not an insured, even if the complaint indicated otherwise, because the law on the issue is unsettled. The carrier asserted it could use extrinsic evidence to show the mother was not an insured, and denied coverage on that basis. The Third Circuit agreed that “because Pennsylvania courts have not ruled on this issue, [the insurer] did not act in bad faith after it ‘reasonably determined that [mother] was not an insured under the Policy.’”
On the merits of coverage itself, the court concluded “that, when the insurer determines a claim is outside the scope of the insurance policy before a suit is filed, it has no duty to defend because it has effectively ‘confine[d] the claim to a recovery that the policy [does] not cover.’” Here, the insurer investigated the claim, and determined the mother was not an insured because she was not a permissive user. “After that determination, the four corners rule no longer applied. [The insurer] did not have a duty to defend, and its actions do not show bad faith.”
Bad Faith Investigation
The court then went on to examine whether a bad faith claim could be stated solely on the basis that the insurer’s investigation was conducted in bad faith. As repeated on this blog ad naseum, there is a genuine issue as to whether there is an independent bad faith claim for poor investigation practices when no coverage is otherwise due. For example see this post from January 2020, this post from August 2020, and this post from earlier in August 2020. A close examination in this case, however, shows the lack of investigation bad faith claim is actually intertwined with the coverage issue. Thus, this is not a case where a party is trying to prove bad faith even though no coverage is due.
Treating investigation based bad faith as a separate cause of action, rather than merely evidence of bad faith, the court observed “[g]ood faith in this context requires that an insurance determination be ‘made diligently and accurately, pursuant to a good faith investigation into the facts’ that is ‘sufficiently thorough to provide [the insurer] with a reasonable foundation for its actions.’” The mother argued the record showed she had “implied permission” to use the car, and the carrier acted in bad faith by unreasonably failing to recognize she had implied permission. The court disagreed, finding no adequate evidence to defeat summary judgment on the issue.
No Common Law Bad Faith Claim
“Finally, although the standard for common law bad faith diverges from statutory bad faith … the common law action for bad faith is a contract claim. Thus, because [the mother] was not an insured, she was not party to the contract, and she had no common law contract claim to assign….”
Date of Decision: December 8, 2020
Myers v. Geico Cas. Co., U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit No. 19-1108, 2020 WL 7230600 (3d Cir. Dec. 8, 2020) (Fisher, Restrepo, Roth, JJ.)
