INSURED FAILS TO ADEQUATELY PLEAD BAD FAITH; CAN CONDIO BE USED TO DEFINE THE SCOPE OF THE BAD FAITH STATUTE AFTER TOY (Philadelphia Federal)
The insured failed to plead a plausible bad faith claim in this first party property loss case.
We will address two things about this case. First, the details in the court’s decision granting the motion to dismiss. Second, the court’s finding that statutory bad faith can consist of more than the denial of first party benefits or the denial of a defense and indemnification in third party claims.
Failure to Plead a Plausible Bad Faith Claim
As discussed many times by the federal district courts addressing bad faith claims, conclusory allegations simply carry no weight in adequately pleading a bad faith claim. Courts will parse the complaint to determine what non-conclusory facts have actually been pleaded, what allegations are merely conclusory boilerplate and can be disregarded, and whether facts left standing after that process can support a plausible bad faith claim.
In this case, the facts pleaded only included the location of covered property, that a peril covered under the policy caused direct physical loss and damage to the property, that prompt and timely notice of loss was given to the carrier, and that the insured fully complied with all necessary policy terms and conditions.
The complaint went on to aver generically 13 forms of bad faith behavior, with no factual detail (listed below). The court readily found these allegations conclusory.
The court gave particular attention to a few of these conclusory allegations. For example, the complaint alleges the carrier “’misrepresent[ed] pertinent facts or policy provisions relating to coverages at issue’ and ‘sen[t] correspondence falsely representing’ that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the Policy….” However, the complaint failed “to explain what those misrepresentations may have been.”
Plaintiff also averred that the insurer “’fail[ed] to fairly negotiate the amount of [Plaintiff’s] loss” … but provides no details describing what was unfair about the negotiations.” Judge Padova added that “[t]he Complaint’s remaining bad faith allegations merely assert that [the insurer] was not prompt, thorough, fair, or reasonable in how it handled or denied the claim, but does not provide any facts explaining how [it] was not prompt, thorough, fair, or reasonable.”
The Complaint was dismissed with leave to amend.
Can Courts Rely on the Superior Court’s 2006 Condio Decision to Determine the Scope of the Bad Faith Statute after the 2007 Supreme Court Decision in Toy v. Metropolitan Life
Though not ultimately relevant to the court’s decision, the opinion states that:
“‘[S]ection 8371 is not restricted to an insurer’s bad faith in denying a claim. An action for bad faith may [also] extend to the insurer’s investigative practices.’” Greene v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 936 A.2d 1178, 1187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (alterations in original) (quoting Condio, 899 A.2d at 1142). Indeed, the term bad faith “‘encompasses a wide variety of objectionable conduct’” including “‘lack of good faith investigation into facts, and failure to communicate with the claimant.’” Id. at 1188 (quoting Condio, 899 A.2d at 1142).
The Superior Court decided Condio in 2006.
In the 2007 Supreme Court Toy v. Metropolitan Life decision, Chief Justice Cappy, writing for the majority, observed that at the time of the Bad Faith Statute’s 1990 enactment, “the term ‘bad faith’ concerned the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the parties’ contract and the manner by which an insurer discharged its obligations of defense and indemnification in the third-party claim context or its obligation to pay for a loss in the first-party claim context.” “In other words, the term captured those actions an insurer took when called upon to perform its contractual obligations of defense and indemnification or payment of a loss that failed to satisfy the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in the parties’ insurance contract.”
Justice Eakin, writing in concurrence, found this reading too narrow. In their competing opinions, Justices Cappy and Eakin specifically debate the meaning and application of Condio in statutory bad faith actions. Justice Eakin cites Condio, among other Pennsylvania Superior Court cases, to argue the majority’s interpretation of the bad faith statute is too narrow.
In response, Chief Justice Cappy does not reject the Condio opinion, but states that Condio is addressing a different aspect of “bad faith” than what the court had to decide that day.
Justice Cappy finds there are two aspects to “bad faith” in the context of section 8371. “As we observe in footnotes 17 and 18, we do not consider what actions amount to bad faith [conduct], what actions of an insurer may be admitted as proof of its bad faith, whether an insurer’s violations of the UIPA are relevant to proving a bad faith claim or whether the standard of conduct the Superior Court has applied to assess an insurer’s performance of contractual obligations in bad faith cases is the correct one.” Rather, “[i]n this area, the term ‘bad faith’ refers not only to  the claim an insured brings against his insurer under the bad faith statute, but also,  to the conduct an insured asserts his insurer exhibited and establishes that it is liable. These matters although related, are nonetheless, separate and distinct. We write to the former. The concurrence appears to write to the latter.”
Justice Cappy specifically describes the issue in Condio, and other Superior Court cases cited by Justice Eakin, as “whether the evidence offered at trial by the insured as to the insurer’s behavior was sufficient to prove the bad faith claim and/or admissible in a § 8371 action.” Thus, it appears, Condio does not address the scope of what claims are cognizable under the Bad Faith Statute in the first instance, but addresses the adequacy of evidence in proving bad faith.
In light of (1) this distinction raised by the Toy Majority between the two uses of the term “bad faith”, (2) in direct response to Justice Eakin’s argument that statutory bad faith claims should broadly encompass the kind of behavior identified in Condio, and that such claims not be limited to “the manner by which an insurer discharged its obligations of defense and indemnification in the third-party claim context or its obligation to pay for a loss in the first-party claim context,” then (3) it is questionable that Condio, and other pre-Toy Superior Court cases, can expand the category of cognizable claims under the Bad Faith Statute to include conduct beyond “the manner by which an insurer discharged its obligations of defense and indemnification in the third-party claim context or its obligation to pay for a loss in the first-party claim context….”
by sending correspondence falsely representing that Plaintiff’s loss [was not] caused by a peril insured against under the Policy [and that Plaintiff] was not entitled to benefits due and owing under the Policy;
in failing to complete a prompt and thorough investigation of Plaintiff’s claim before representing that such claim is not covered under the Policy;
in failing to pay Plaintiff’s covered loss in a prompt and timely manner;
in failing to objectively and fairly evaluate Plaintiff’s claim;
in conducting an unfair and unreasonable investigation of Plaintiff’s claim;
in asserting Policy defenses without a reasonable basis in fact;
in flatly misrepresenting pertinent facts or policy provisions relating to coverages at issue and placing unduly restrictive interpretations on the Policy and/or claim forms;
in failing to keep Plaintiff or [her] representatives fairly and adequately advised as to the status of the claim;
in unreasonably valuing the loss and failing to fairly negotiate the amount of the loss with Plaintiff or [her] representatives;
in failing to promptly provide a reasonable factual explanation of the basis for the denial of Plaintiff’s claim;
in unreasonably withholding policy benefits;
in acting unreasonably and unfairly in response to Plaintiff’s claim;
m. in unnecessarily and unreasonably compelling Plaintiff to institute this lawsuit to obtain policy benefits for a covered loss, that Defendant should have paid promptly and without the necessity of litigation.